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ABSTRACT 
This paper offers an alternative approach to the repeated occurrence of 
Middle East 'energy conflicts'. Our analysis centres around the process of 
differential capital accumulation, emphasizing the quest to exceed the 'normal 
rate of return' and to expands one's share in the overall flow of profit. 
With the evolution of modern capitalism, the dictates of differential accu- 
mulation become an ever stronger unifying force, drawing both state 
managers and corporate executives into increasingly inextricable po-wer- 
driven alliances. 
The Middle East drama of oil and arms since the 1970s has been gr6atly 
affected by this process. On the one hand, rising nationalism and intensi- 
fied industry competition during the 1950s and 1960s forced the major 
oil companies toward a greater cooperation with the OPEC countries. The 
success of this alliance was contingent on the new atmosphere of 'scarcity' 
and oil crisis, which was in turn dependent on the progressive milita- 
rization of the Middle East. On the other side of the oil-arms equation 
stood the large US and European-based military contractors which, 
faced with heightened global competition in civilian markets and limited 
defence contracts at home, increased their reliance on arms exports to oil- 
rich countries. 
Over the past quarter century, the progressive politicimtion of the oil 
business, together with the growing comrnercialimtion of arms transfers 
helped shape an uneasy Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition' between the 
principal military contractors and petroleum companies. As their environ- 
ment became intertwined with the broader political realignment of OPEC 
and the industrial countries, the differential profits of these companies 
grew evermore dependent on the precarious interaction between rising oil 
prices and expanding arms exports emanating from successive Middle 
East 'energy conflicts'. At the same time, these companies were not 
passive bystanders. This is suggested firstly by the very close correlation 
existing between their arms deliveries to the Middle East and the region's 
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oil revenues and, secondly, by the fact that every single 'energy conflict' 
since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War could have been predicted solely by 
adverse setbacks to the differential profit performance of the large oil 
companies! 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of the present century, the economic significance of 
the Middle East has primarily stemmed from the region's oil exports. 
From the late 1960s onward, such significance has been shared with a 
newer flow of arms imports. As oil crises became tied to armed conflicts, 
there developed a growing and increasingly synchronized movement of 
petrodollars (revenues from petroleum exports that flow into the Middle 
East), and weapondollars (revenues from arms imports which flow out of 
the region). Unfortunately, this connection between oil and weapons 
remains a serious threat. The end of the Cold War created new pres- 
sures to increase arms exports, and the continued race for natural 
resources means that a new oil crisis is not at all unlikely. Under certain 
circumstances, the convergence of these two trends could again spark a 
renewed conflict in the Middle East, with potentially devastating 
regional consequences and adverse global implications. 
Most studies dealing with the link between oil and arms in the Middle 
East have been based on a 'statist' frame of reference. The basic unit of 
analysis here is the nation-state, whose actions are dominated by central 
decision makers seeking to achieve broad macroeconomic or macropolit- 
ical goals. Economists have often tended to approach the issue as part 
of an international equilibrium between raw materials and industrial 
commodities, so their attention has been naturally focused on the feasi- 
bility of 'recycling' between oil and arms. Chan (19801, for example, 
emphasized the balance-of-payment problems arising from the oil crises 
and examined the efforts of both consuming and producing countries 
to 'resolve' these imbalances via arms trade. A similar analysis was 
offered by Snider (19841, who sought to find whether the governments 
of the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Italy were 
selling weapons to offset the cost of oil imports. The conclusions of these 
and similar studies (such as Ray, 1976, and Pfaltzgraff, 1978) are usually 
denominated in aggregate terms: the main emphasis is on national goals 
- for example, economic growth and price stability for the industrial 
countries, and a bolstered 'self-image' and internal stability for the oil- 
exporting nations. 
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This universal language is consistent with the more macropolitical 
literature which emphasizes the 'realist', or 'state-centred' perspective to 
the link between raw materials and international conflict. The political 
anthropology underlying these writings portrays a menacing Hobbesian 
environment with each nation seeking to endure in a largely anarchic 
world. Survival and security in this context hinge on economic pros- 
perity, national preponderance and military prowess, and these are 
critically dependent on the differential access to raw materials and 
advanced technology. According to the more 'materialistic' strand of this 
literature (such as Nordlinger, 1981, and Waltz, 1979, for instance), this 
dependency serves to explain why central decision makers, particularly 
in the large developed countries, are so sensitive to any small realign- 
ment in the international allocation of strategic raw materials, weapons 
and critical technologies. And thus, as the international arena grows 
increasingly complicated, the effective control of these key commodities 
and capabilities must inevitably shift away from the large private firms 
and into the hands of state officials, whose foreign policies become 
increasingly 'autonomous' from the pressures exerted by the underlying 
'societal groups'. 
Other macropolitical approaches tend to emphasize the 'idealistic' 
aspects of foreign policy. For instance, in his 1978 study, Defending the 
National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy, 
Krasner claimed that, following the redistribution of international power 
after the Second World War, US raw-material policy has shifted from a 
material to an ideological footing focused mainly on containing commu- 
nism and promoting free markets. A somewhat more subtle 
interpretation was offered by Lipschutz (1989), who argued that nations 
tend to clash over key raw materials because these provide the crucial 
link between the material interests of economic and military capabilities 
on the one hand, and the ideal interests of influencing markets and states 
on the other. 
The main shortcoming of the state-centred approaches stems from 
their lack of clear empirical criteria for conjectures and refutation. 
Krasner, for instance, contended that in order to test the statist view 
against its 'societal-based' counterparts, it is sufficient to show that state 
officials maintain a consistent (time-invariant) ordering of goals. Yet, why 
should such consistency preclude liberal or Marxist explanations? 
Indeed, Krasner himself admitted that there is no obvious operational 
means of differentiating the statist view from the structuralist approach 
of the Marxian literature.' Furthermore, the significance assigned to 
officially expressed preferences and goals is not entirely convincing, 
particularly since these often stand in sharp contrast to the consequences 
of attendant policies. For instance, based on his survey of US oil policies 
since the 1940s, Krasner argued that in order to contain communism, 
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American central decision makers were willing to sacrifice their lesser 
goals of security of supplies and greater market competition. In his 
opinion, this was a 'non-logical' policy borne from the 'misconceptions' 
of state officials, but that, of course, leaves the door open to alternative 
explanations. And indeed, starting from a Marxist perspective, Bromley 
(1991) concluded that, contrary to the realist and liberal interpretations, 
US oil policies were in fact both 'instrumentalists' and 'functionalist' in 
nature - that is, supportive of the large oil companies and the capitalist 
order as a whole. 
The international flows of oil and arms have been examined also from 
the more disaggragate perspective of the underlying industries, but here, 
too, there is a considerable lack of unanimity, even on fairly substantive 
issues. Writing from an implicit 'instrumentalist' view, Blair (1976) and 
Engler (1977), for example, contend that, intentionally or not, the energy 
policies of parent governments (particularly the United States, Great 
Britain and the Netherlands) have had the effect of assisting the 
international oligopoly of world oil. A different view is expressed by 
Turner (1983) and Yergin (1991), who, in line with a more 'statist' 
perspective, argue that there was a gradual but systematic erosion in 
the primacy of international oil companies and that, since the 1970s, 
these firms were in fact acting as 'agents', or intermediaries between 
their host and parent governments. Studies on the international arms 
trade have been equally controversial. According to Sampson (1977), the 
absence of any international consensus on disarmament creates a void, 
which is then filled by the persistent sales effort of the large weapon 
makers. Arms exports become significant particularly in peace time, 
which may partly explain why they started to grow in the early 1970s 
with the ending of US involvement in Vietnam (see also Brzoska and 
Ohlson, 1987; Brzoska and Lock, 1992; and Ferrari et a1 ., 1987). This claim 
seems consistent with the 'underconsumption' approach forwarded by 
neo-Marxist writers such as Magdoff (1969), O'Connor (1973) and Griffin 
et al. (1982). According to Krause (1992), however, the impact of private 
producers on arms sales policies should not be overstated, at least not 
in the case of the United States where the volume of arms exports is 
small relative to domestic military procurement and the contractors' 
civilian sales. 
International political economy - bringing capital 
accumulation back in 
As we see it, the existing literature is besieged by two key problems. 
First, there is no clear theory accounting for the political realignment of 
the large international oil and armament corporations in the Middle 
East. Second, there is a disturbing lack of systematic empirical data, 
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particularly those pertaining to the activities and performance of the 
leading corporations. For example, we were unable to find anywhere in 
the recent literature long-term time series for the profits of the large 
armament and oil firms; but, then, how could one discriminate between 
the 'state-autonomy' and 'instrumentalist' views when even the most 
basic facts about corporate performance remain obscure? Unfortunately, 
the source of these problems extends beyond the particular subject of 
armament, oil and Middle East conflicts. Here, as elsewhere in the 
modem literature on the international political economy, we find that 
little or no attention is paid to the issue which matters most - the process 
of capital accumulation. 
Our dissatisfaction with existing approaches has led us to try and 
develop an alternative starting point, a new historically dynamic 
perspective which may help bring accumulation back in. The issue of accu- 
mulation goes to the core of international political economy and we feel 
that the interaction of armament and oil in the Middle East could not 
be fully understood without it. Moreover, given the global significance 
of oil and arms, tying Middle East conflicts and oil crises with the 
process of capital accumulation may provide insight into other aspects 
of international political economy. For example, many of today's 
commonly-used terms - such as 'monopoly capitalism', 'finance capital', 
'imperialism' and 'corporatism' - were debated and formulated at the 
turn of the century, with the rise of 'big business' and 'big governments'. 
The backdrop of these controversies and many of their case studies were 
drawn from or related to the emergence of the oil, finance and heavy 
military industries which now operate in the Middle East and which 
constitute the focus of our study. Furthermore, contemporary debates 
on issues like 'state and capital', the 'governability crisis' and the 
'American U-Turn', stem from the accumulation crisis of the largest 
corporations and the ongoing international realignment of which they 
are a central component. 
In focusing on the process of accumulation, our study of the arms-oil 
nexus and the recent history of Middle East 'energy conflicts' is recast 
in two main ways. First, our basic unit of analysis is not the 'state', 
but the multinational corporation. Note that this choice says nothing on 
the relative signhcance of the 'firm' vis ri vis the 'state'. As we shall 
argue below, the modem system of business enterprise integrates private 
ownership as well as public office and state institutions as indispens- 
able aspects of accumulation. However, the ideal appearance of 
accumulation (as distinguished from its social ramifications) reveals itself 
through the corporation's financial reports, and so if we are to say some- 
thing about it we must start from the legal corporate entity.2 Second, 
instead of focusing on the clash of 'national interests', we argue that the 
international political economy is also (and perhaps more so) driven by 
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differential corporate petJomnce. Again, this is not meant to exclude the 
interaction among states or between states and firms. To the contrary, 
we see these interactions as lying at the heart of modern capitalism, only 
that the criteria which guide them are now increasingly denominated in 
terms of differential capital accumulation. 
From tangible to pecuniary accumulation3 
What is capital and what is the meaning of capital accumulation? 
Surprising as it may sound, the answer to this question - even after 
several centuries of rapid capitalist expansion - is still anything but clear. 
Economists tend to deal with both in physical, material terms. Capital is 
generally seen as manmade means of production, 'capital goods' which 
participate - together with labour, land and technology - in the produc- 
tion process. And with this definition for capital, accumulation is then 
naturally taken to denote the material amassment of capital goods. 
Although there are some variations in style and emphasis, the focus on 
the tangible essence of capital is all pervasive. Mainstream economists, 
such as Alfred Marshall, suggest that we look at capital as a 'store of 
things' which 'aid or support labour in production, . . . [and] without 
which production could not be carried on with equal efficiency, but 
which are not free &ts of nature' (1920: 648-9, emphasis added). 
Similarly, summarizing the various ways in which economists have tried 
to define capital, Joseph Schumpeter concludes that, in its essence, 
'capital consisted of goods', and specifically, of 'produced means of 
production' (1954: 632,633, emphasis added). The Marxists offer a funda- 
mentally different view, though their understanding, too, remains 
captured within the material framework of production and consump 
tion. For them, capital is not a physical thing, but rather a social 
relationship embedded in physical articles. Their measurement of capital 
and accumulation, however, is denominated in terms of 'dead labour' - 
that is, in physical or caloric units of human effort (or socially necessary 
labour time) spent in producing capital goods and in reproducing the 
labour force (Catephores, 1989: 87-106; Sweezy, 1942: ch. 7; Wright, 1977: 
200). 
And so, despite the otherwise marked contrast between them, main- 
stream and Marxian economics do seem to share at least one 
fundamental principle in common: they both view accumulation through 
technological spectacles. In the first system, capital is said to expand 
because of its own productivity, whereas in the later this happens thanks 
to the productivity of labour - though regardless of this difference 
(rooted undoubtedly in their opposing ideological dispositions), in each 
case the mechanics of accumulation are ultimately a matter of produc- 
tion. Indeed, in this sense, the production function of neo-classical 
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economics, Marxfs value equation and even Sraffafs input-utput 
scheme stand on the same footing: they are all denominated in 'real 
termsf. 
However, there were always some lingering doubts about the produc- 
tive underpinning of capital. Marx, for example, felt compelled to place 
the productivity of capitalism at the core his theory; yet, in a prophetic 
passage foreseeing the eventual demise of his own labour theory of 
value, he predicted that the growing integration of industrial processes 
and knowledge will eventually render meaningless any specific link 
between value and labour time (cited in Marcuse, 1964: 35-6). The same 
principle, expressed somewhat differently and in a much more technical 
way, also underlay the Cambridge Controversy of Capital which raged 
after Sraffa (1960) demonstrated that the quantity of capital was a fiction, 
and that productive contributions could not be used to explain prices 
and distribution. The Cambridge Controversy, however, raised more 
questions than it answered. Indeed, if it were not production, what was 
it that determined the value of capital and its pace of accumulation? 
Interestingly, the answer to this question was already suggested much 
earlier by Thorstein Veblen (1904, 1923). Criticizing the prevailing 
consensus of his time, Veblen pointed out that, unlike economists, busi- 
nessmen tended to think about capital and accumulation in pecuniary, 
not material terms. For the modern investor - the owner of corporate 
stocks - capital does not denote machines, structures or raw materials, 
and accumulation has little to do with the material augmentation of such 
articles. Instead, for the investor, capital simply means the monetary 
value of his securities and accumulation is nothing more than the 
temporal increase in that value. The value of capital is of course not an 
independent entity, but rather a capitalization of anticipated business 
earnings, and its pace of accumulation is ultimately dependent on the 
expected growth of such earnings. Contrary to the economist's conven- 
tion, however, Veblen argued that the source of these earnings was only 
partly and often not at all related to the underlying productivity of the 
owned machines and hired workers. 
Means and ends: differential accumulation as a 'power index' 
What severed the link between profits and productivity? The principal 
cause, according to Veblen, was the growing separation between 
'industry' and 'businessf, or between productive activity and absentee 
ownership. As production grew into an evermore complex, inter- 
dependent and coordinated communal process - the distribution of 
income, and hence the value of capitalized earnings, were increasingly 
determined by the antagonism of power. Continuing Veblen, we can 
argue that the essence of such power lies in the ability of owners 
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to put specific technological, institutional, legal and political barriers on 
the common use of resources and know-how. In this sense, the value 
of capital reflects a capitalization not of productive contributions, but of 
restrictive limitations. The nature of these limitations has undergone 
continuous change since the emergence of capitalism, and particularly 
since the rise of 'big businessf and 'big governmentf in the late nine- 
teenth century. In the present century, the power determinants of profits 
and accumulation have shifted further into the political realm of govern- 
ments, with factors like taxation, tariffs, subsidies and patent laws now 
being increasingly augmented by international institutions such as trade 
zones, regional investment agreements and global, government-backed 
corporate alliances. 
Power, however, is not only the means of accumulation, but also its 
most fundamental aim. In saying so, our basic point of departure is that 
large-scale business enterprise is driven by the same principal force 
which seems to have animated all previous civilizations - namely, the 
quest for control over nature and p e ~ p l e . ~  In other words, much like the 
conquest of land or the capturing of slaves in earlier times, the modern 
process of capital accumulation is not only a consequence of power but 
also its principal manifestation. This emphasis serves to explain why, 
when we come to the measurement of power, standard economic indices 
such as 'production', 'employmentf, 'salesf, or 'pricesf are not very useful. 
The reason is that these categories are typically conceived from the point 
of view of hedonic utilitarianism which prevailed in early capitalism: 
their ultimate purpose is to tell us something about 'well-beingf. From 
the power perspective of mature capitalism, however, such indices are 
rarely illuminating since the quest for domination and control has little 
to do with utility and well-being. And indeed, the typical large firm 
displays no intrinsic interest in producing more rather than less, or in 
making its product cheap rather than expensive. Buying and selling, 
hiring and firing, inflating or dumping are of course highly s i e c a n t ,  
but rarely as ends in themselves; instead, these are merely the means 
by which the corporation seeks to achieve a higher goal - that of earning 
profits.5 
The primacy of the profit motive is of course well known, but its inter- 
pretation remains problematic. The difficulty arises when mainstream 
economic theory proceeds to assume - mistakenly in our view - that 
the quest for profit could also be denominated in utilitarian, hedonic 
terms. To elucidate the problem, consider the standard practice of 
computing 'real profitf by dividing the nominal profit by the consumer 
price index. The idea is to obtain a measure for the 'purchasing power 
of profitf, but then there arises the question of whether profits are indeed 
earmarked for current or eventual consumption. In the case of small 
businesses, the answer may be positive, particularly for the self- 
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employed. But when we look at the large modern firm, that no longer 
holds true. The notion that the global business behaviour of Exxon, 
Mitsubishi, Daimler-Benz, or Ford is ultimately geared toward maxi- 
mizing the 'consumption power' of their owners simply sounds 
irrelevant. Large-scale business enterprise is of course obsessed with 
profitability, but for reasons which are largely devoid of any hedonic 
considerations6 
But then if it is not consumption, what is it that animates the owners 
and managers of the large firms? What other than hedonic pleasure can 
drive the relentless pursuit of profit? The answer begins by noting that, 
in the new order of large-scale business enterprise, the ultimate goal is 
not tangible, but nominal gain. The insight of Veblen is again illumi- 
nating. 'In all these civilized countries where the price system has gone 
into effect', he writes, 'men count their wealth in money-values. So much 
so that by settled habit . . . men have come to the conviction that money- 
values are more real and substantial than any of the material facts in this 
transitory world . . . and when a person has sold his goods, and so 
becomes in effect a creditor by that much, he is said to have "realized" 
his wealth, or to have "realized" his holdings.' Paradoxically - though 
not surprisingly - '[iln the business world the price of things is a more 
substantial fact than the things themselves' (1923: 88-9, emphases added). 
This historical move from the tangible to the nominal is rooted in the 
difJerential culture of business enterprise. For the large firms, success or 
failure are measured not in terms of increase or decrease in the quan- 
tity of commodities their profit can buy, but rather in relation to what 
other firms have achieved. For example, a 20 per cent decline in the net 
profit of Philip Morris may not be considered disconcerting if the drop 
came in the wake of an overall recession. In contrast, however, a 5 per 
cent rise in earnings would be interpreted as evidence of a serious 
strategic failure if the Fortune 500 average rose by 10 per cent and 
competitors such as Nest16 or RJR Nabisco recorded gains as high as 20 
per cent. Indeed, contrary to customary textbook notions, it appears that 
modern corporations are preoccupied not with 'maximizing' their profit, 
but rather with 'beating the average'. Unlike the former which is forever 
unobservable, the latter appears to be everywhere. References to the 
'average' or 'normal' pervade the economic and business literature - 
from the analysis of stock performance, through the stacking of country 
growth rates and risk prernia, to the ranking of corporate profitability - 
and it is this differential habit of thinking which more than anything 
else animates the owners and managers of the large corporations. 
Based on these considerations, we can argue that the guiding prin- 
ciple of big business is the quest for diferential pecunia y accumulation. 
Specifically, this means (1) that the ultimate goal of large-scale business 
enterprise is the ongoing increase in profit, (2) that businessmen think 
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about such profit solely in nominal terms, and (3) that they evaluate 
their success or failure on a purely differential scale - that is, relative to 
other firms. The emphasis on differential pecuniary accumulation has 
far-reaching methodological implications. Note that in trying to beat the 
average rate of profit, the corporation is effectively seeking to control a 
larger share of the societal surplus. In other words, differential profits and 
redistribution are two sides of the same thing. The crucial point here is that 
the quest for redistribution is not a means toward some hedonic end, 
but rather the final goal of business enterprise. Redistribution, then, is 
sought for its own sake - that is, for the sake of power. 
The upshot of all of this is that, in the context of business enterprise, 
power is in fact no less quantifiable than well-being. While the latter can 
be approximated by the various quantities of production and consump 
tion, the former is incarnated in the rnagniwdes of differential profit and 
in the patterns of its distribution. In this paper we focus on two such 
'power indicators'. One is the differential rate of return, defined as the 
ratio between the rate of return for a given firm or group of firms on 
the one hand, and the average rate of return for a wider reference group 
on the other. For example, the differential rate of return for a cluster of 
large non-government oil companies could be approximated by taking 
the ratio between their own rate of profit and the average rate of profit 
in the Fortune 500 group of companies. The result, measured as a pure 
number, could be seen as an index of 'disruptive success' - an indica- 
tion for 'how well' this group of large oil companies is doing within the 
disruptive sphere of global business and international politics. A value 
greater than unity for the index indicates that the oil group's restrictive 
tactics (or the failure of other firms to successfully implement such 
tactics) have helped it outperform the 'average' to its own distributive 
advantage; by extension, a value below unity implies a disappointing 
outcome and a redistributive loss. 
Another related index is the distribution of profit, measured as the share 
of profit of a given universe of firms obtained by a subset of that 
universe. This index could provide some indication for the evolution of 
relative corporate power. For example, a long-term increase in the share 
of Fortune 500 profit appropriated by a subset of leading defense contrac- 
tors may suggest a parallel rise in the political-economic leverage of 
military companies vis-li-vis their civilian counterparts. A similar index 
could also be used to compare corporate to non-corporate entities: for 
example, by contrasting the earnings of oil producing countries with the 
profits of non-government petroleum companies we may be able to learn 
on their relative power vis-li-vis one another and how it changes over 
time. Thus, while the first index points to a temporal position on a differ- 
ential power scale, the second may be useful to identify time trends in 
the distribution of power. 
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Differential pecuniary accumulation: back to international 
political economy 
The use of such 'power indices' is meant to accentuate differential 
accumulation as the central process of mature corporate capitalism. This, 
of course, does not imply that corporate organizations and insti- 
tutions are somehow more significant than governmental ones. Indeed, 
with the development of modern capitalism, corporate executives and 
policy makers have been drawn evermore closer together into a 
mutually-dependent relationship. During its early stages, capitalism 
comprised two relatively separate spheres; legal authority was 
largely embedded in the factory while the political structure was relevant 
to business mostly in an abstract, speculative sense. In the present 
century, these two spheres have evolved into a much more complex 
'composite'. The development of large-scale business enterprise was inti- 
mately related to the expanding regulatory powers of the nation- 
state, while the evolution of the nation-state was itself inextricably bound 
up with the spread of corporate capitalism. Since the 1980s, this 
double-sided process has reached a new stage with the emergence of 
even more complex relationships - this time between global corporate 
coalitions and supra-national associations. Seen in this light, capi- 
talism exhibits a continuous progression toward an ever greater 
symbiosis between the political and the economic, with each stage 
creating new and more inseparable 'political-economy alloys'. However, 
the broader context of this interdependency goes beyond the mere 
interplay of 'rational actors', as both the corporation and the state slowly 
lose their 'autonomy' to the universal dictates of differential pecuniary accu- 
mulation. 
The ideal side of this politico-economic transition is the rise of differ- 
ential accumulation as a principal regulatory mechanism. With the 
advance of global production come the integration of world financial 
markets, the interdependence of trade and capital flows, and the rise of 
a truly global ownership structure. The essence of this universalization 
appears in the emergence of the so-called 'normal rate of return' - a 
conventional standard of accumulation which corporate managers of both 
political and business organs feel increasingly obliged to exceed. The 
'normal rate of return' and the constant quest to beat it through 
differential accumulation are abstract, indeed, ideal concepts. In their 
highest incarnation they are nothing more than bits and bytes parking 
in computerized databases or riding the information superhighways. But 
these ideal conventions have acquired social omnipotence and could not 
be ignored. 
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The Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition 
Our goal in this article is to demonstrate the signijicance of differential 
pecunia y accumulation as it applies to the interaction of weapons and oil 
in the Middle East. Given our emphasis on processes, we have deliber- 
ately chosen not to dwell on the corporate executive or the policy maker. 
Furthermore, with the exception of occasional commentary, our aim is 
neither to test the existing statist, liberal or Marxist views, nor to offer 
any comprehensive alternative. These extensions are relevant and impor- 
tant but go beyond the scope of our paper and must await further 
research. 
Using differential accumulation indices as a basis for analysis, our 
tentative hypothesis is that, since the 1970s, there was a growing conver- 
gence of interests between the world's leading petroleum and armament 
corporations. Following the rising nationalism and intensified industry 
competition during the 1950s and 1960s, the major international oil 
companies have lost some of their earlier autonomy in the Middle East. 
At the same time, the region was penetrated by large US and European- 
based manufacturing companies which, faced with heightened global 
competition in civilian markets, increased their reliance on military 
contracts and arms exports. Over the past quarter century, these devel- 
opments helped shape a Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition between the 
large military and oil firms, whose differential profitability came to 
depend on the precarious interaction between rising oil prices and 
expanding arms exports emanating from successive Middle East 'energy 
conflicts'. 
Following this introduction, the second section of the paper focuses 
on the Arma-Core of large US-based companies (comprising the 
largest armament produces at the core of the war economy), examining 
their differential performance and their relative dependency on dom- 
estic military procurement. The arms contractors relied heavily on 
domestic demand, but they also found it necessary to seek foreign 
markets for their hardware. The third section deals with the changing 
nature of arms exports - their increasing commercialization and the way 
in which they have been affected by the global redistribution of income 
in the wake of the oil crisis. The fourth section examines the other side 
of the process, tracing the impact of oil crises on the large petro- 
leum companies. The received view is that, since the late 1960s, the 
rise of OPEC and the growth in the number of lesser firms under- 
mined the relative position of the Seven Sisters which previously domi- 
nated world oil. However, this perception is not supported by the 
evidence. Based on their differential profit performance, it appears that 
the large international oil companies have in fact maintained and even 
consolidated their relative power. The key to their success was a 
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political alliance with OPEC based on the new atmosphere of 
'scarcity' and oil crisis. However, OPEC and the oil companies could 
not have established this 'limited flow' regime on their own. In 
retrospect, we argue that this was crucially dependent on the increasing 
militarization of the Middle East which was largely (though not 
exclusively) propagated by the military contractors of the Arrna-Core. 
The fifth section offers a framework in which the interactive interests of 
the oil and armament companies help explain the parallel interaction 
between energy crises and armed conflicts. The last section draws on 
and develops these findings as a basis for a new research agenda - 
pertaining to the Middle East in particular and international political 
economy in general. 
2. THE MILITARY BIAS IN THE US ECONOMY A N D  
THE RISE OF THE ARMA-CORE 
The impact of economic structure on military spending has been noted 
already during the early decades of the twentieth century, when insti- 
tutionalists such as Veblen (1904, 1923) and Marxists like Hilferding 
(1910) and Luxemburg (1913) pointed to military spending and imperi- 
alism as a means of counteracting the monopolization and excess 
capacity of modern ind~s t ry .~  Yet, it was only much later, with the 
Korean and Vietnam conflicts of the 1950s and 1960s, that military 
spending appeared to become not only a consequence of economic struc- 
ture, but also a permanent force shaping that structure. 
Perhaps one of the first writers to recognize this double-sides rela- 
tionship was Michal Kalecki. Much of his early writings from the 1930s 
and 1940s were concerned with the effect on macroeconomic perfor- 
mance of the 'degree of monopoly' in the underlying industries. Toward 
the end of his life, during the 1960s, he closed the circle, pointing to the 
way in which macroeconomic policy, primarily military spending, could 
affect the economic and social structure. In his articles The Fascism of 
our times' (1964) and Vietnam and US big business' (1967), Kalecki 
claimed that a continued US involvement in Vietnam would increase 
the dichotomy between the 'old', largely civilian industries located 
mainly in the East Coast, and the 'new' business groups, primarily 
the arms producers of the West Coast. The rise in military budgets, he 
predicted, would bring a redistribution of income from the old to the 
new groups, so as to further strengthen the 'angry elements' within 
the US ruling class and propagate what Melrnan (1970) later called the 
'permanent war economy'. 
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The Anna-Core 
Was Kalecki right? Has the epicentre of the US big economy indeed 
shifted from 'civilian' to 'military' oriented corporations? To answer 
this question we must first identlfy the 'Am-Core' of the US economy 
- that is, the inner group of large firms which appropriate the lion 
share of defence-related contracts, and which are sufficiently large 
to exert significant political pressure. A first approximation of this 
core could be derived from data published by the US Department of 
Defense (DoD), in its annual listing for the 100 Companies Receiving the 
Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards. From this publication 
we can learn that military procurement is fairly concentrated, such that, 
over the period extending between 1966 and 1991, the largest 100 
contractors accounted for between 62 and 72 per cent of the DoWs 
total prime contracts awards. However, it is probably inappropriate 
to consider all of the leading 100 firms as members of the Arma-Core. 
Our tentative criterion for inclusion in this core is for the firm to be 
both large and sufficiently dependent on defence contracts, and not all 
of the leading 100 companies fit these characteristics. Some corporations 
- such as AT&T, IBM, ITT, Eastman Kodak, Ford, Chrysler, Exxon, 
Mobil and Texaco - are very large, but then military contracts account 
for only a modest share of their overall sales revenues. Others, like 
Singer, Teledyne, E-System, Loral, FMC, Harsco and Gencorp, rely more 
heavily on defence sales, but are probably not big enough to have a 
notable political leverage. If we concentrate only on the large defence- 
dependent contractors, we end up with a more limited group of about 
20-25 firms which, together, could be thought of as the Arma-Core of 
the US econom~.~  
The precise choice of boundary between the Arma-Core and the 
remaining contractors is of course arbitrary to some extent, a problem 
which is further exacerbated by periodic changes in the relative ranking 
of firms. Given the attendant uncertainty and ambiguity, we find it 
convenient to focus on a more limited sample of only sixteen large 
defence-dependent corporations. These include, in alphabetical order: 
Boeing, General Dynamics, General Electric, Grumman, Honeywell, 
Litton Industries, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, Martin Marietta, 
Northrop, Raytheon, Rockwell International, Texas Instrument, Textron, 
United Technologies and Westinghouse. This group is representative 
of the Arma-Core in that it consists of only large firms and, wi h only 
minor exceptions, it included the ten top DoD contractors every 
year between 1966 and 1991 .9 During the 1966-91 period, the 4 sixteen 
firms received more domestic military contracts than any othe ' compa- 
rable group of American corporations: on average, they acc nted for m: 
36 per cent of the DoD's total prime contract awards, witb a floor of 
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30 per cent (in 1966) and a ceiling of 41 per cent (in 1985). (Aggregate 
financial data for these firms are given in Appendix A.) 
Let us turn now to characterize some aspects of the Arma-Core and 
assess its relative significance within the US 'big economy'.10 The first 
question concerns the 'military bias' of the big economy - that is, the 
degree to which its large firms depend on military contracts. The concept 
of 'dependency' is of course not entirely unambiguous. As we empha- 
sized in the introduction, the key factor determining the success, indeed 
the very survival of a capitalistic firm is not sales but profits. Ideally, 
then, the military dependency of a firm should be measured by the share 
of its total net profit attributed to defence-related activity. This, however, 
is easier said than done and, unfortunately, such computations could 
not be made with available data." A commonly used alternative is the 
ratio of defence contract awards to overall sales revenues. This latter 
indicator has certain shortcomings. First, dependency on military sales 
may have no simple relation with dependency on military profit.I2 
Second, strictly speaking, the ratio is not temporally adequate since it 
compares contract awards which denote advance orders, with sales 
revenues which represent actual deliveries. Nevertheless, given the wide 
usage of this index, and since we are interested here merely with broad 
comparisons, we can still employ it as a useful indication for the mili- 
tary bias of the US big economy. 
Consider then the entries in Figure 1, which describes the ratio of DoD 
prime contract awards to total sales revenues over the 1966-91 period, 
first for our sixteen-firm sample of the Arma-Core, and then for the 
entire big economy tentatively represented by the Fortune 500 group of 
industrial companies.13 The dependency index for the Arma-Core is 
computed as the ratio between the aggregate contract awards and aggre- 
gate sales revenues of the sixteen-firm sample. For the big economy, we 
adopt the simpllfylng assumption that practically all of the DoD prime 
contracts are awarded within the Fortune 500 group. The index is then 
calculated as the ratio between the total value of these contracts and the 
aggregate sales revenues of the Fortune 500 firms.14 
The data reveal two significant patterns. First, the military bias of the 
big economy appears to have changed more or less together with that 
of the Arma-Core. Specifically, we can see that, for both groups, the 
dependency index declined until the mid-1970s, stagnated until the late 
1970s, rose through the early 1980s, and then declined again until the 
early 1990s. Beyond this temporal similarity, however, e two indices 
differed, both in their average level, as well as in the am itude of their 
fluctuations. Over the 1966-91 period, the Fortune 500 gro p depended 
on military contracts for an average of 6.5 per cent of ! the, total sales, 
and that dependency ranged between a low of 4 per cent (kn 1974) and 
a high of 11 per cent (in 1967). The comparable figures for the Arma- 
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Figure 1 Ratios of DoD prime contract awards to total sales revenues 
Source: DoD prime contract awards for the Arma-Core firms are aggregates of individual 
corporate awards, whereas the Fortune 500 prime contract awards are assumed equal to 
the DoWs total. Both data are from US Department of Defense, 100 Companies Receiving 
the Lar est Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards (various years). For sales data, see 
~ ~ ~ e n % i x  A. 
Core, on the other hand, fluctuated around the much higher average of 
30 per cent, and with more pronounced variations - between 21 per cent 
(in 1991) and 42 per cent (in 1985). 
So, although changes in military procurement affected the big 
economy and its Arma-Core in much the same direction, it is evident 
that the large military contractors were far more dependent on these 
budgets and much more sensitive to their fluctuations than the rest of 
the big economy. This in turn means that, when looking for the struc- 
tural aspects of military spending, one must go beyond the simple 
aggregates - including ones which. narrow their focus only to the big 
economy - and whenever possible concentrate specifically on those 
pivotal groups which compose the Arma-Core at the centre of the war 
economy. 
This methodology is useful when we come to assess Kalecki's predic- 
tion for the rising power of military-based industries. If Kalecki was 
right, and the centre of gravity has indeed shifted toward defence-related 
activity, this should have improved the position of the Arma-Core 
Total profit ratio (46) 
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Average profit ratio 
Figure 2 The rise of the Anna-Core: relative profit indicators (16 firms) 
Source: For the Arrna-Core profit, see Appendix A. Fortune 500 profits are from The 
Fortune 500' (various years). 
relative to the other large firms. The most straightforward way to 
examine this process is to look on the distribution of net profit within 
the big economy. In Figure 2, we describe the underlying changes in 
two related ways. The left-hand scale of the chart denotes the total profit 
ratio, measured as the relative share of the sixteen Arrna-Core firms in 
the overall net profit earned by the Fortune 500 corporations.15 The right- 
hand scale indicates the average profit ratio, computed as a ratio between 
the average profit per firm in the Arma-Core and the average profit per 
firm for the Fortune 500. Since the number of companies in each group 
is fixed, the latter ratio is given by a simple linear transformation of the 
former. The meaning of the two indices is different, however. To the 
extent that these profit ratios are indicative of relative corporate 'power', 
the former denotes the overall power of the entire Arma-Core, while the 
latter signifies the proportionate power of a typical Arma-Core firm. 
The impression of changing fortunes that emerges from this picture 
supports Kalecki's prediction. In 1967, when spending on the Vietnam 
War was close to its peak, the Arma-Core was appropriating as much 
as 5.1 per cent of the total net profit earned by the big economy. In that 
year, a typical Arma-Core firm, measured by the size of its net profit, 
was already 1.6 times larger than an average Fortune 500 corporation. 
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The end of US involvement in Vietnam and the relative drop in mili- 
tary budgets mitigated the power of the Am-Core and, until 1974, 
reduced the total profit ratio down to 3.8 per cent and the average profit 
ratio to 1.2. Since the mid-1970s, however, the Arma-Core firms have 
been on the rise once more. With defence budgets increasing again, the 
total profit ratio climbed more or less continuously reaching 10.7 per 
cent by 1985, when an average Arma-Core firm earned 3.3 times the net 
profit of its Fortune 500 counterpart. Since the mid-1980s, with defence 
procurement levelling off, the climb of the Arma-Core has halted and 
the total and average profit ratios fluctuated around an average of 9.2 
per cent and 2.9, respectively. All in all, these structural developments 
seem to have followed the path anticipated by Kalecki: since the Vietnam 
conflict, the United States has maintained sizeable defence expenditures, 
and although the precise contribution of such spending to the ascent of 
its main recipients could not be easily deciphered, it appears safe to 
conclude that this persistent military bias served to enhance the relative 
power of the Arma-Core. 
Globalization and the military bias 
To a certain extent, this interaction between military expenditures and 
business restructuring was also part of a much broader, worldwide 
transformation in the relationships between nation-states and multi- 
national firms. Following the Second World War, the global economic 
significance of the US economy began to wane. To illustrate: in 1960, 
the US GDP was one and a half times larger than the combined total 
for today's 12 EU members and Japan; in 1992, after three decades of 
relative decline, it amounted to only one half of that total.16 During the 
early 1950s and 1960s, the US economy was still a relatively 'closed' 
market. The sum of export and import amounted to about 10 per cent 
of the GNP and the country ran a trade surplus. After the 1970s, 
however, things began to change. Foreign trade has now risen to around 
20 per cent of the GNP but, as the country began to 'open', it also started 
to suffer from growing trade deficits.17 This decline has been reflected 
in the global share of US exports which represented about 20 per cent 
of world exports in the early 1950s, but dropped to less than 10 per 
cent by the early 1990s.18 Finally, the United States has been increas- 
ingly penetrated by foreign-based firms, primarily from Europe and 
Japan. As late as 1970, US direct investment abroad, which totalled $78 
billion, was still six times larger than the $13 billion of direct foreign 
investment in the United States. By 1989, US direct investment abroad 
totalled $374 billion, but that was already lower than the direct hold- 
ings of foreigners in the United States which reached $401 billion in that 
same year.19 
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But then, this overall international decline of the US macroeconomy 
accelerated the multinational expansion of USbased corporafions and 
made the domestic market decreasingly s ighcant  for their operations. 
The relative 'eviscerationf of the US is evident from the geographic redis- 
tribution of corporate profit: while during the early 1 9 5 0 ~ ~  USbased firms 
obtained only about 10 per cent of their net profit from foreign operation, 
by the early 1990s, this has more than tripled to over 30 per cent.20 
With these transformations in mind, it is now easier to understand 
why, over the past quarter century, the most successful US corporations 
were often those which relied more heavily on military-related activity. 
Facing a growing international competition in civilian markets, many 
large US firms became highly dependent on attractive government 
 contract^.^' (Indeed, at least part of their decline in civilian markets could 
be attributed to the attraction of profitable government business.) 
This state of affairs entangled the US government in a persistent commit- 
ment to 'military Keynesianism' which, interestingly enough, was only 
strengthened by the growing internationalization of the big corporations. 
The reason is that, with a larger share of corporate profits coming from 
abroad, domestic government policies affected a diminishing portion of 
these firms' earnings and, so, all other things being equal, a given increase 
in the companies' overall profit required a larger increment of domestic 
military contracts. Under these circumstances, any attempt to eliminate 
the military bias of the US economy spelled a major blow to the credi- 
bility of macroeconomic policy and, perhaps no less importantly, a 
serious injury to some of the country's most powerful firms. 
However, the reliance of Arma-Core firms on their government's 
spending has never been complete. The problem arises from an intrinsic 
contradiction between the requirements of arms making and the reality 
of arms selling. From its industrial side, the technology-intensive nature 
of weapon production requires continuous research and development 
and open production lines. Furthermore, the manufacturing of modern 
military hardware is a highly specialized process which cannot be easily 
converted into civilian use (and even when conversion is technologically 
feasible, demand for the additional output may still be too small). These 
industrial considerations call for a sfable growth in the demand for arms, 
but that is not what usually happens in the armament business. Acting 
as a drain on the country's resources, military expenditures must be 
legitimized by external threats, and these tend to fluctuate with the ups 
and downs of international politics and the frequency of armed conflicts. 
As a consequence, domestic weapon procurement is inherently unsfable 
and that poses a serious difficulty for the large arms makers. If these 
firms are to keep their production lines open, they could never rely 
solely on domestic procurement and must constantly look for 'counter- 
cyclical' export markets. 
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3 ARMS EXPORTS: PROFITS, FOREIGN POLICY AND 
GLOBAL INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 
The perils of restricted demand are hardly new, of course. For example, 
during the eighteenth century's Seven-Years War, Frederick the Great 
found himself forced to import 32,000 rifles from abroad and that, 
because only a few years earlier he decided to cut down production 
capacity for lack of domestic demand (Frederick the Great, 1979: 18). 
The simplest solution for this dilemma would have been to supplement 
the home market with foreign sales, but, initially, that was not at all 
obvious and for a very simple reason: the making of weapons was 
usually run by the state whose officials were hardly enthusiastic about 
selling them to potential enemies. Increasingly, however, the advance of 
industry moved the production of armament into private hands, which 
in turn enabled the arms business to expand into an intricate international 
market. The imperative of combining private ownership and foreign 
sales was succinctly elucidated in 1913, when, on the eve of the First 
World War, Krupp got entangled in a corruption scandal. Answering 
his critics in the Reichstag, the Minister of War, Josias von Heeringen, 
defended this new system, arguing that in order to maintain sufficient 
capacity for wartime, military producers had to export in peacetime; this, 
he insisted, could be achieved only by private firms which were free 
from the patriotic scruples of state companies (Sampson, 1977: 42). And 
indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century, the large armament firms 
- such as Krupp, Nobel, Armstrong, Vickers, Du-Pont, Electric Boat and 
Carnegie - were all privately owned and highly dependent on foreign 
markets. Most importantly, the production and sale of arms were, by 
and large, an unregulated business (ibid., chs. 2-4). 
This structure of the military industry first came under close scrutiny 
during the 1920s and 1930s. After the First World War, the League of 
Nations pointed to the arms companies as a major fomenter of interna- 
tional conflict, thus flaring a series of official investigations into the arms 
business, particularly in Europe and the United States. Following the 
Nye Committee hearings, an isolationist US Congress passed the 1935 
Neutrality Bill with a special provision for a National Munitions Control 
Board to supervise American arms exports. The Lend Lease Act of 1941 
brought the US government further into the centre stage of the arms 
trade, and by the end of the Second World War, it was commonly 
accepted that the export of weapons was no longer a private affair, but 
rather an integral part of the country's foreign policy. 
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The resurgence of the arms trade 
After the war, the Truman Doctrine' saw military exports, particularly 
to Europe, as part of the larger effort to contain communism, a goal 
which was later extended to legitimize arms shipments to South East 
Asia. Yet this new emphasis on broader policy goals has done little 
to resolve the industry's intrinsic problem of unstable demand. The 
continued military Keynesianism of the 1950s and 1960s created the 
basis for an Arma-Core of large military-dependent firms and, by 
the late 1960s, toward the ending of US involvement in Vietnam, 
these corporations appeared just as vulnerable to budget cuts as 
were the Carnegies and Du-Ponts of the turn of the century. Despite 
several decades of change, US weapon production has remained a 
predominantly private undertaking and, with a receding war effort, 
it was now once again seeking to counteract excess capacity with foreign 
military sales. 
The renewed significance of export markets is illustrated by the data 
displayed in Figures 3a and 3b. In the first of these charts, we contrast 
the overall dollar value of US domestic military procurement with that 
of US military exports (excluding construction and services), for the 
period between 1963 and 1989. (Both series represent actual deliveries 
and are denominated in constant prices.)= Looking at the data, we can 
see how, during the mid-1960s, military exports (directed mainly to 
South Vietnam), began to rise, and how this was eventually followed 
by increases in domestic procurement to sustain the intensified war 
effort. After the late 1960s, however, this positive relation was no longer 
apparent. While domestic spending began to decline in 1968, arms 
exports (now flowing increasingly to the Middle East) continued to 
increase until 1973. Beginning in the mid-1970s, domestic military sales 
again started to rise, and continued their ascent until the subsequent 
reversal of the mid-1980s. Military exports, on the other hand, did not 
Figure 3a US domestic and export deliveries of defence products (1987 prices) 
Figure 3b Share of military-related profits attributed to arms exports 
Source: Domestic deliveries (in current prices) are from Citibase (19901, series MSNF, 
pp. MI-3-5. Exports deliveries (in current prices) are from the US Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (various years). 
GDP price deflator is from US Congress, Economic Report of the President (19931, Table 
B-3, p. 352. 
Note: Domestic procurement denotes the value of manufacturing shipments of defence 
products. Arms exports comprise shipments of military commodities, including dual-use 
equipment when primary mission is military, but excluding military services such as 
construction and training. Constant-price data are obtained by dividing current-price data 
by the US GDP implicit price deflator. 
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exhibit any compensating decline and, throughout the period continued 
to fluctuate around their early-1970s levels. 
Considering the relative magnitudes of the two series, one may be 
tempted to conclude that military exports must have been relatively 
unimportant for the US arms makers. The export figures varied between 
a low of $4.1 billion (in 1964) to a high of $14.3 billion (in 1987), whereas 
domestic procurement figures were far higher, ranging from a low of 
$47.1 billion (in 1974) to a high of $109.6 billion (in 1986). Such compar- 
isons have led researchers like Krause (1992: 106) to reject the 'economic' 
rationale for US foreign military sales, but this inference may be too 
hasty. Note that, ultimately, what matters for the arms makers is not 
the level of sales, but the amount of profit, and that tends to be far higher 
in export sales than in domestic procurement. An internal DoD study 
cited in Brzoska and Ohlson (1987: 120) estimates that foreign military 
sales are 2.5 times more profitable that those made to the US govern- 
ment. Similar ratios - ranging from 2 to 2.3 - emerge from industry 
sources (US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991: 53). This 
kind of information cannot tell us about the absolute magnitude of profit 
in each type of activity, but it may help us assess their relative signifi- 
cance. 
To do that, let us divide overall military sales (MS) into their domestic 
component (MS,) and export component (MS) and denote the ratio 
between the profit markups on export and domestic sales by v (meaning 
that military exports are v times more profitable than domestic procure- 
ment). The relative dependency of military-related profits on military 
exports (RDMP,) is then given by: 
RDMP, = (v x MS)/(v xMS, + MS,) 
Suppose now that, over the past quarter century, US arms exports were 
twice as profitable as domestic military sales. What would that mean for 
the relative dependency of overall military profit on foreign sales 
(RDMP,)? Using available data for domestic procurement (MS,) and 
exports (MS,) as given in Figure 3a, and substituting 2 for v, we obtain 
the temporal pattern of that dependency outlined in Figure 3b. The 
results of this computation are of course imprecise, first, since the respec- 
tive profit markups vary over time and, second, because the average 
value of v may differ from 2. Yet given that we focus here only on the 
long-term changes in RDMP, these imprecisions are not likely to alter 
our inference. 
First, we can see that contrary to the common view, military exports 
are not at all redundant for the arms makers. Based on our conserva- 
tive assumption for v, during the period between 1963 and 1989, these 
exports accounted for an average of 22.7 per cent of all military-related 
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profit in the United States. Second, over the years, the changing balance 
between domestic and foreign weapon sales worked to alter the relative 
sipficance of arms exports for military-related profit. The emerging 
historical pattern could be divided into three distinct phases: the period 
between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s when RDMP, exhibited a more 
or less continuous increase - from a low of 12.0 per cent in 1964, to a 
high of 34.1 per cent in 1973; the subsequent period until the mid-1980s 
in which the index declined, reaching 14.8 per cent by 1986; and, finally, 
the recent period, from the mid-1980s onward, when the index seems 
to have reverted back to a rising trend - a tendency which will most 
probably continue in the 1990s.= These observations suggest that arms 
exports not only remained an important contribution to the well-being 
of US weapon makers, but also that during periods of slack domestic 
demand, such contribution could be critical for their survival.24 
Commercialization and regional shifts 
Given these considerations, it is then not surprising that the course of 
US foreign policy became inextricably bound with the business side 
of military exports. The interaction between trade and the flag has been 
in affected by two closely-related developments. The first of these 
developments, outlined in Table 1, was the gradual commercialization 
of arms exports. The second development, illustrated in Table 2, involved 
shifts in the global distribution of 'hot regions' from Europe, to South 
East Asia, to the Middle East and North Africa. Let us examine these 
issues more closely. The entries in Table 1 provide data on the average 
annual value of US arms sales in the four decades between 1950 and 
1989, and some initial figures for the early 1990s. The data are further 
broken down, first by programme of delivery and then by method of 
financing. Looking at the breakdown by delivery, we can see that there 
was a gradual movement from aid-financed programmes to paid-for 
purchases. During the 1950s, military assistance accounted for nearly 95 
per cent of all arms transfers but, over time, that has fallen systematic- 
ally, dropping below one per cent by the early 1990s. The decline in the 
value of military grant programmes was more than compensated, 
however, by deliveries through the foreign military sales programme, 
which rose both in absolute as well as relative terms, from just over 
5 per cent of the total in the 1950s, to about two-thirds in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Since the 1980s, there was also a marked increase in direct 
corporate-to-government commercial sales, which, by the early 1990s, 
reached almost one-third of all deliveries - up from only one-tenth in 
the 1960s and 1 9 7 0 ~ . ~ ~  Note that some foreign military sales and commer- 
cial transactions which are formally funded through loans, end up being 
paid for by the US government via waived payments. As we can see 
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Table 1 Components of US arms exports by programme and financing 
(annual averages) 
Distribution Distribution 
by programme by financing 
(percentage of total) (percentage of total) 
Period Total Foreign Direct Commercial Military Loans 
($ million/ military military salesd assistance or 
year) assistanceb sales' + waived cask 
payment# 
Source: Computed from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1978, Table 591, p. 373; 1979, Table 594, p. 368; 1991, 
Table 553, p. 341; 1992, Table 537, p. 341, and from US Defense Security Assistance Agency, 
Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as o f  September 
30, 1989, and as of September 30, 1992. 
Notes 
a These data are more comprehensive than those published by the US Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in that, in addition to defence articles, they also include 
the value of military construction and services. 
Comprises deliveries under Military Assistance Service Funded Programme (MASF), 
Military Assistance Programmes (MAPS) and Section 506(a) Drawdown Authority. 
Include the export of commodities, construction and services under the Foreign Military 
Sales Programme (FMS). 
Cover direct corporate-to-government transactions under the Direct Commercial Sales 
Programme (DCS). 
Data for 1979-82 were interpolated. 
from the distribution by financing, however, even if we take this into 
account, the overall picture is still one of persistent commercialization 
- with the combined proportion of deliveries funded through military 
assistance and waived loans dropping from about 95 per cent in the 
1 9 5 0 ~ ~  to two-fifths in the 1960s, to one-third or less since the 1970s. 
The backdrop for this gradual transition could be illustrated in refer- 
ence to Table 2, where we provide a regional breakdown for the world's 
main arms-importing regions during four distinct periods. The general 
picture emerging from the data indicates both an ongoing expansion in 
the overall volume of arms transfers, as well as a continuous change in 
their geographic focus. In the first period, between 1963 and 1964, global 
arms imports (or exports) amounted to an annual average of $11.7 
billion, with about one half going to Europe (all dollar figures are in 
constant 1987 prices). In the aftermath of the Second World War, the 
European continent was perceived as potentially unstable and, indeed, 
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Table 2 Arms imports by region (annual averages) 
Of which (percent of world total) 
Period World total NATO 6 East Middle Afrrca Others 
($ rnillion/year, Warsaw Asia East 
1987 prices") Pact 
Source: Original current-price data are from US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (various years). (Because of repeated 
updates, data are from the last annual publication in which they appear.) Implicit GDP 
deflator is from US Congress, Economic Report of the President, 1993, Table El-3, p. 352. 
a Constant price data are computed by dividing the original nominal figures by the US 
implicit GDP deflator. 
until the mid-1960s, the United States still sent most of its military assis- 
tance - primarily in the form of surplus stockpile grants - to its NATO 
allies. Since 1965, however, this emphasis has begun to change. The 'hot 
spot' of the East-West conflict moved to South East Asia and with it 
came a rapid escalation in the global armament trade. Over the 1965-73 
period, world arms import rose by 65 per cent, to an annual average of 
$19.4 billion - with over one-third now going to East Asia (South East 
Asia and China). In the United States, the shift of focus from Europe to 
the outlaying areas of the Third World brought a redefinition of arms- 
export policies. Weapons deliveries to Vietnam and other South East 
Asian countries were still financed by aid (largely through the Military 
Assistance Service Fund Programme (MASF), but the European coun- 
tries were now increasingly requested to pay for their US-made weapons. 
This change, which signalled a return to the pre-war commercial pattern 
of weapon sales, was to some extent inescapable. After the Second World 
War, US arms transfers came to be seen as a tool of foreign policy, but 
that appearance could be maintained only as long as those exports 
remained relatively small. The problem was that the policy of 'commu- 
nist containment through military assistance' depended crucially on the 
Administration's ability to appropriate the adequate aid funds, and as 
time passed, this became increasingly difficult to achieve. With the US 
relative decline in international markets came also a growing fiscal crisis 
in the domestic arena. The federal budget deficit, which stood at an 
annual average of only 0.4 per cent of GDP during the 1950s, started to 
rise - initially only slightly to 0.5 per cent of GDP in the 1960s, but 
then more rapidly, to 1.9 per cent in the 1970s, 4.1 per cent in the 1980s, 
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and 4.8 between 1990 and 1993.26 This long-term development exerted 
constant pressure toward a greater 'commercialization' of arms exports. 
During the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the 
trend was limited mainly to transactions with the NATO allies, but the 
late-1960s entanglement in Vietnam hastened the final policy reversal. 
Since 1969, the 'Nixon Doctrine' stipulated that all transfers of weapons 
- including those going to the Third World - should, whenever possible, 
depend not on direct US military involvement, but on the buyer's ability 
to pay. 
The single most important factor enabling this shift from aid to sales 
was the major global redistribution of income occurring in the wake of 
the 1973 oil crisis. The explosive growth in the oil revenues of OPEC 
countries made them ideal clients for weaponry and, in 1974, after the 
US exit from Vietnam, the Middle East became the world's largest 
importer of armaments. Over the 1974-84 period, Middle East countries 
accounted for 36.3 per cent of the global arms trade, which by the had 
increased by 136 per cent, to an average annual level of $45.6 billion 
(during that time, there was also a sigruficant rise in the share of African 
countries, primarily oil-exporting Libya). The pivotal role of global 
income redistribution in this process can hardly be overstated. Indeed, 
the drop of oil revenues through the latter half of the 1980s had a nega- 
tive impact on the arms trade: during the 1985-9 period, global military 
transfers rose only marginally to an average annual level of $51.1 billion, 
with much of the stagnation attributed to the decline in Middle East 
imports which now amounted to only 32.9 per cent of the total. (Recently, 
the global redistribution of income has taken a new turn with the rapid 
growth of some Far East countries such as Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and South Korea, and it is interesting to note that this shift has been 
accompanied by a 'mini-boom' of military imports flowing into their 
region. These higher imports account for much of the 1985-9 increase 
in the share of 'Others' recorded in Table 2.) 
To sum, the post-war era was marked by several important changes 
affecting the nature of arms production and trade. In the United States, 
there emerged, particularly after the Vietnam conflict, an Arma-Core of 
very large defence contractors which came to appropriate a growing 
share of the big economy's net income. The relative growth of these 
companies was influenced by the continuous 'military bias' of the US 
economy, which was in turn partly the consequence of a progressive 
decline of Usbased firms in global civilian markets (on top of a domestic 
'profit squeeze' as described in Harrison and Bluestone, 1988). At the 
same time, the consolidation of this powerful group of firms must have 
turned them into an important element affecting government policy - 
mostly in the domestic budgetary process, but increasingly also in the 
choice of foreign policy. This latter significance stemmed primarily from 
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the intrinsic dependence of arms production on flexible foreign demand. 
After the Second World War, the US Administration made military 
exports into a tool of foreign policy but, over time, the very menu of 
policy options has been increasingly bound up with the development of 
the Arma-Core. Initially, the need for foreign markets was rather limited 
and was easily fulfilled by US-financed military aid. However, the 
continuous ascent of defence-dependent corporations eventually raised 
the pressure for arms exports up to a level which could no longer be 
financed solely by US-government grants. The historical solution for this 
dilemma was a gradual return to the prewar pattern of commercial 
trade in weaponry, and what made this transition feasible was the global 
redistribution of income which came in the wake of the Middle East 
oil crises. 
With this latter development, the US Arma-Core found itself entering 
the centre stage of Middle Eastern 'energy conflicts' - an entry of far- 
reaching structural consequences. The large defence contractors which 
earlier depended mainly on the level of domestic military spending and 
foreign military aid, now found their financial fate increasingly corre- 
lated with the boom and bust of the oil business. This, however, was 
only one part of a much broader transformation. As it turned out, the 
arms makers were not the only players who found their theatre trans- 
muted under their own feet. Also with them on the same moving stage 
were the newly empowered OPEC governments, the governments of the 
imperilled Western countries, and the major petroleum companies whose 
dominant position in the world of oil was now called into question. The 
emergence of the Middle East as the 'hot spot' of world conflict and the 
leading arms-importing region has altered the delicate relationships 
between these multinational corporations and both their parent and host 
governments; furthermore, the seemingly circular sequence of regional 
wars and oil crises brought the petroleum companies into a new, and 
in some way unexpected alliance with the arms makers. Before we can 
turn to examine the underpinnings of this alliance, however, we must 
look more closely on the changing circumstances in the petroleum 
industry. 
4 MIDDLE EAST OIL A N D  THE PETRO-CORE 
The energy crisis of the 1970s heightened the so-called 'multinational 
debate' on the role of large companies in transnational relations. Studies 
on the international politics of energy could be conveniently classified 
as belonging to three main schools. Radical interpreters such as Tanzer 
(1974, 1980), Stork (1975), Engler (19771, Jenkins (1987) and Bromley 
(1991), place the major oil companies as pivotal actors in the global- 
ization of capital, and hence tend to emphasize 'instrumentalist' and/or 
ARTICLES 
'structuralist' aspects of energy policies. Liberal observers like Adelrnan 
(1972) and Vernon (1971), acknowledge the significance of the oil majors, 
though, in their opinion, the importance of these companies stems not 
from any lasting political power, but rather from the ephemeral monop- 
olization of critical technologies. Finally, contrary to both liberal and 
radical views, conservative scholars such as Krasner (1978) and 
Lipschutz (1989), tend to discount the notion that the major oil compa- 
nies have had a crucial impact on the politics of oil, emphasizing instead 
the supremacy of the 'state' and the 'national interest'. 
Interestingly, the evidence used in this debate is conspicuously incom- 
plete. Thus, there is considerable reliance on Congressional hearings into 
the conduct of foreign policy and on other publicly-available govern- 
ment documents, but as most observers know too well, the relevant 
activities of the major oil companies remain cloaked in secrecy and 
knowledge about their impact on public policy leaves much to be desired 
(see for example, Barnet, 1975: vii; Turner, 1983: 1234). Moreover, even 
if we had known everything there was to know on the goals and poli- 
cies of all principal actors, that in itself would still be insufficient. 
Although highly instructive and often indispensable, this type of 
evidence (which is usually all that we get from the correspondence of 
public officials and testimonies of company executives) is still largely 
'circumstantial'. What is missing is a clear focus on differential accumu- 
lation. If we are to assess both the balance of power among the different 
actors, as well as the extent to which they have achieved their respec- 
tive goals, we need to deal with more 'objective' data, particularly those 
regarding the relative business performance of the oil companies. 
Surprisingly, however, such analysis is often deficient or simply lacking 
from the debate. As we demonstrate below, the consequences of this 
inadequacy have been detrimental, for, by ignoring a few but crucial 
financial statistics, many researchers have prematurely inferred the 
demise of the large oil companies. 
Demise of the oil majors? 
The dominant view among students of the subject is that the oil crisis 
of the 1970s signalled the final stage in a fundamental qualitative trans- 
formation which began in the 1950s and eventually altered the structure 
of the oil industry. The first aspect of this transformation has been the 
relative decline of the major oil companies vis-a-vis a growing number 
of lesser firms. After the Second World War, the 'Seven Sisters' - notably 
Exxon (then Standard Oil of New Jersey), Royal-Dutch Shell, British 
Petroleum (previously Anglo-Iranian), Texaco, Mobil, Chevron (then 
Socal) and Gulf - still dominated the relatively concentrated international 
oil arena. Gradually, however, the entrance of smaller independent 
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companies, the growth of existing firms other than the seven largest, 
and the re-entry of the Soviet Union into Western energy markets 
contributed to a sigruficant erosion in the market position of the oil 
majors and a substantial drop in corporate concentration. The conse- 
quences of these changes were that, over the two decades between 1953 
and 1972, the share of the 'Seven Sisters' in the oil industry outside the 
United States fell from 44 per cent to 24 per cent of all concession areas; 
from 92 to 67 per cent of proven reserves; from 87 to 71 per cent of 
production; from 73 to 49 per cent of refining capacity; from 29 to 19 
per cent of tanker capacity; and from 72 per cent to 54 per cent in product 
marketing (Jacoby, 1974: Table 9.12, p. 211). 
A second and perhaps more important facet of this transformation 
was that the locus of control, which previously rested with the owner 
and officers of the large petroleum companies, has now apparently 
shifted into the hands of government officials, monarchs and dictators. 
At the 'upstream' part of the industry, the oil companies succumbed to 
the relentless nationalistic pressure of their host countries, and after a 
quarter-century of eroding autonomy eventually surrendered most of 
their crude-oil concessions. Once begun, the transition was swift and 
decisive. The multinational companies which as late as 1970 still owned 
about 90 per cent of all crude petroleum produced in the non-comrnu- 
nist world, found their equity share drop sharply to only 37 per cent by 
1982, most of it now concentrated in North America (figures provided 
by Hartshon and cited in Penrose, 1987: 15). A similar change o c m e d  
at the 'downstream' segment of the industry, particularly in the Western 
industrial countries. With the oil crisis, the cost of energy and its very 
availability became major policy issues with wide-ranging domestic and 
foreign implications, so that here, too, the firms found they had to 
comply with political dictates - in this case, those coming from their 
own parent governments. Energy in general and petroleum in particular 
became political questions and just 'as war was too important to be left 
for the generals', writes Yergin (1991: 613), 'so oil was clearly too impor- 
tant to be left to the oil men'. 
And so emerged the 'demise thesis'. According to Turner (1983: 
118-241, after the Second World War the major companies have come 
to assume various roles, acting as 'governmental agents', as 'transmis- 
sion belts' between host and parent governments, as occasional 
'instigators', or simply as 'complicating factor' - but, in his opinion, all 
of these roles have merely added some colour to the sphere of interna- 
tional political economy. In the final analysis, he argues, it was the 
diplomats who were making the crucial decisions, and the multinational 
petroleum companies - particularly after the oil crisis - have been 
pushed aside, reduced to a status of 'interested bystanders' in the high 
politics of world oil (ibid.: 147-8). 
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The 'demise thesis' appears fashionable and persuasive. It certainly 
seems as the next logical step in a long theoretical sequence which began 
with the 'bureaucratic revolution' of the 1930s, continued through the 
'managerial revolution' of the 1940s and the 'death of competitive capi- 
talism' of the 1960s, and led to 'statism' during the 1970s. There is only 
one problem: the supporting evidence is divorced from the central regu- 
latory mechanism of capital accumulation; it tells us nothing about the 
appropriation of profit. In the final analysis, capitalism emerged and 
expanded not because it offered a new ethos, but because that ethos 
helped the rising bourgeoisie alter the distribution of income from 
landed rent to business profit. For that reason, those who argue in favour 
of bureaucratic-statist determinism, or believe in the demise of big busi- 
ness must go to the essence of capitalism and demonstrate that these 
developments have fundamentally altered the distribution of income and 
the mechanism of accumulation. 
Thus, in order to conclude that the oil majors have indeed declined, 
we must show not only that they have lost market shares and 
become dependent on government policies, but, ultimately, that these 
structural and institutional changes have affected their business 
performance. If the large petroleum firms were in fact squeezed 
between the increasing discipline of market forces and the growing 
demands of governments, that must have exerted a considerable 
downward pressure on their earnings. Under these circumstances, 
one would have expected the net profits of the oil companies to wither 
- either absolutely, or at least relative to some broader aggregates. 
Surprisingly, however, this has not been demonstrated in the Litera- 
ture. Most studies pertaining to the 'multinational debate' in the 
energy sector either gloss over the issue or simply ignore it altogether, 
and even where profits are referred to, the data are often incomplete 
and rarely analysed in a wider historical context.27 Unfortunately, 
this neglect helps distort the overall historical picture, for while the 
institutional and structural indicators may imply that the major oil 
companies have declined, that is not at all what the profit data seem 
to suggest! 
In Table 3, we provide some long-term summary indices for the profit 
performance of the world's six largest petroleum companies. This group 
- which we shall label here as the 'Petro-Core' - consists of the original 
'Seven Sisters' with the exception of Gulf which was acquired by 
Chevron in 1984. (Aggregate financial data for the Petro-Core firms are 
given in Appendix B.) The comparison focuses on relating the profit 
performance of the Petro-Core to corresponding figures for larger corpo- 
rate groupings, including a wider composite of petroleum firms, the 
Fortune 500 group of US-based companies, and the US corporate sector 
as a whole. 
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Table 3 Relative profitability indicators: the Petro-Core (6 in relation 
to selected aggregates (annual averages, percent) 
Rate-of-return ratios Net-profit shares (per cent) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Period Rate Petro-Core Petro-Core Petro-Core Petro-Core Petro-Core 
- - - - - 
petroleum Fort une petroleum 'Fortune AZZ ' US 
return 4 M 2 b  500 4 M 2  502'" corp. 
Source: For net profit and rate of return on equity of the Petro-Core, see Appendix B. 
Net profit of all US corporations are from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, The National lncome and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-1 982. 
Statistical Tables, Table 6.21B, pp. 309-10; from Citibase (1990), Table 6.21B, p. X-6-9, series 
GAA; and from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, 1992, Table 871, p. 542. Net profit and rate of return on equity 
for the Fortune 500 are from The Fortune 50(Y (195592). Net profits and rate of return 
on equity for the world's 4042 leading petroleum firms are from Carl H. Pforzheimer & 
Co, Comparative Oil Company Statements, as reported in the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States (various years). 
Notes 
a The P e W o r e  consists of British Petroleum, Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, Royal/Dutch Shell 
and Texaco. 
The Petroleum 4042 denote the Pforzheirner & Co group of major non-governmental 
petroleum corporations, representing a composite of 4042 major worldwide oil firms 
aggregated on a consolidated, total company basis. 
The 'Fortune 502' comprise the Fortune 500 corporations, as well as British Petroleum 
and Royal/Dutch Shell. 
Excluding 1931-2 in which total US net corporate profits were negative. 
For 1954-9. 
For 1966-9. 
For 1968-9. 
The first column gives the average annual net rate of return (net profit 
on owners' equity) for the Petro Core. The overall impression from these 
data is that the oil crises of the 1970s and early 1980s in fact helped boost 
the profitability of the large oil companies, a notion which we return to 
examine more closely later in the article. For our purpose 
here, however, the more interesting results are those obtained from the 
differential indices. In the second column, we present the rate-of-return 
ratio between the Petro-Core and the 'Petroleum 40-42' group of com- 
panies. This ratio is calculated by dividing the net rate of profit on 
ARTICLES 
equity obtained in the Petro-Core, by the matching rate attained by the 
'Petroleum 40-42' - the latter being a broader cluster of the world's 40-42 
largest non-governmental petroleum ~ompanies .~~ The results show that, 
during the late 1960s and 1970s, despite the competitive assaults from new 
entrants, the Petro-Core was able to maintain its net rate of return more or 
less in line with the other oil companies, and that during the 1980s it in fact 
succeeded in surpassing them. A somewhat similar result is obtained in 
the third column, where we compare the net rate of return for the Petro- 
Core with that of US 'big economy', approximated by the Fortune 500 
group of companies (see Section 2). Here, too, the large Petro-Core firms 
exhibit a remarkable staying power, even after the 'OPEC revolution' and 
the politicization of the Western oil arena. Indeed, despite the wholesale 
surrendering of concessions, the revoking of some preferential US foreign 
tax-credits and other adverse consequences of the new oil order, the Petro- 
Core's rates of return in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s were higher than 
the comparable averages for the US 'big economy' as a whole. 
Another way to assess the differential earning power of the large oil 
companies is by looking at their relative share in the profit of a wider 
aggregate of companies. This we do in the last three columns, where we 
compute the share of the Petro-Core in the net profits of the 'Petroleum 
40-42' group, the 'Fortune 502' (as defined below) and all USbased 
corporations. Beginning with the first of these net-profit shares (fourth 
column), we can see that, despite the Core's relative decline in terms of 
economic activity (such as concessions, reserves, production, refining, 
transportation and marketing), its distributive share out of the industry's 
net profit did not decrease at all. If we consider the world's largest 4-042 
petroleum companies as a reasonable proxy for the international non- 
governmental petroleum industry, then it appears that the share of the 
Petro-Core in the profits of this group indeed rose - from around three- 
fifths during the late 1960s and 1970s, to almost three-quarters by the 
1980s, and then further, reaching close to four-fifths by the early 1 9 9 0 ~ . ~ ~  
A similar picture emerges when we examine the share of the Petro-Core 
in the net profit of the US big economy (fifth column). Taking the Fortune 
500 group again as our tentative proxy for the big economy, and adding 
to its ranks the European-based British Petroleum and Royal/Dutch Shell 
(which are normally excluded from Fortune's US listings), we can see 
that the profit position of the large Petro-Core firms within this modi- 
fied 'Fortune-502' group has remained surprisingly unassailable. Here 
we have a longer time series, extending from 1954 to 1991, so the compar- 
ison is even more telling. During the late 1950s, when the oil majors 
were still the undisputed leaders of the international oil industry, the 
Petro-Core accounted for nearly one-fifth of the net profits earned by 
the 'Fortune-502' group, but that has hardly changed in the subsequent 
period when these firms presumably lost their pre-eminence to new 
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entrants and politicians. The final indication for the enduring power 
of the Petro-Core is given by their net profit ratio with the US corpo- 
rate sector as a whole - an index for which data are available since 
1930 (sixth column).30 Following the Achnacharry and Red-Line agree- 
ments of 1928, the large international oil companies have consolidated 
their control over world oil to such an extent, that, in the context of 
the Great Depression, they managed to appropriate about 9 per cent 
of all net profits earned by US corporations (inclusive of foreign opera- 
tions). The economic revival of the Second World War raised overall 
corporate profits, thus causing the net profit ratio to drop significantly. 
However, during the 1950s, the ratio began to rise and continued its 
ascent more or less continuously until, in the 1980s, it surpassed 10 per 
cent - a level higher than the one recorded in the zenith years of 
the 1930s! 
Clearly, as we move from means to end - that is, from economic 
activity to differential profitability - the historical picture undergoes a 
substantial change. What appears as the Petro-Core's relative decline 
from the point of view of exploration, production, refining and 
marketing, is not at all that we see when we reach the 'bottom line'. 
Focusing on the ultimate criteria for business success, as measured by 
differential rates of return and the distribution of net profits, it appears 
that the structural transformation of the oil crisis has not spelled the 
final demise of the major oil companies. Indeed, instead of losing ground, 
the Petro-Core appears to have held or even consolidated its leading 
position - relative to other international oil firms, relative to the US big 
economy, and relative to the US corporate sector as a whole. 
Toward a new oil order 
These findings are to some extent puzzling. If, as the statist and liberal 
perspectives seem to suggest, the large oil companies have been indeed 
pressured by greater competition and imposing governments, how could 
they at the same time protect and even enhance their relative profit 
performance? On the other hand, if we chose to interpret the findings 
in Table 3 as supportive of the radical position, how should this conclu- 
sion be reconciled with the oil firms' apparent loss of autonomy and 
reduced market share? The resolution of these seemingly opposing 
developments requires that we separate the fomal institutional arrange- 
ments of the oil industry from its effective power structure. Following 
the line of analysis first anticipated in the wake of the crisis by Blair 
(1976) and recently summarized by Brornley (1991), one may argue that, 
while the changes of the 1970s had indeed altered the formal control of 
oil, the ultimate consequence of this transformation was to consolidate 
rather than undermine the relative earning power of the large petroleum 
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companies. A new and apparently more robust political order has 
dawned on the world of oil. 
Such an interpretation is of course contingent on how one perceives 
the nature of competition and pricing in the petroleum industry. Bina 
(1985), for example, argues that crude-oil pricing is value driven. Starting 
from an orthodox Marxist framework, he suggests that the oil crisis of 
the 1970s occurred primarily because of a sigruficant rise in the cost 
of production in the ageing oil fields of the United States. According to 
his analysis, there was an increase in the labour value of US crude 
petroleum, and since this coincided with the internationalization of the 
oil industry, it then led to a rise in the unified world price of crude oil. 
A rather different view is offered by Adelman (1987), who maintains 
that the price of oil is driven by market power. His argument rests on 
the observation that the cost of production in the marginal fields in the 
United States and the North Sea does not exceed $10 per barrel, whereas 
in the best areas of the Middle East this could be as low as $1 or 
even 25 cents. If the industry was governed by competitive forces 
(as portrayed in neo-classical manuals), production should have shifted 
from the high-cost to the low-cost fields, but since that is exactly the 
opposite of what happened after 1973, the competitive assumption must 
be rejected. There are two reasons to prefer Adelman's to Bina's frame- 
work. One is that, over the last decade, the market price and labour 
value of oil seemed to have moved in opposite directions. Indeed, 
contrary to Bina's prediction for further value-driven increases in the 
market price of oil (Bina, 1985: ix), after the early 1980s the world price 
of crude petroleum has in fact tumbled, both in nominal and real terms 
(see Figure 6 below). The second reason has to do with the magnitude 
and variation of the profit markup. Over the past couple of decades, 
the price of crude oil fluctuated between $10 and $40 per barrel. For the 
least productive fields, with cost of about $10 per barrel, this means that 
the markup of profit over cost oscillated between zero to 300 per cent, 
whereas in the best regions with cost per barrel as low as 25 cents, it 
implies a markup ranging between 3,900 and 15,900 per cent! Both the 
overall magnitudes of these rates, as well as their heightened variability 
are clearly inconsistent with value-driven pricing. 
Note that these observations do not suggest the absence of 'competi- 
tion', but rather a constant tension between rivalry and cooperation. 
The circumstances affecting these conflicting forces are continuously 
changing, and the balance between them - the so-called 'degree of 
monopoly' - is then revealed through the temporal fluctuations of the 
profit markup.31 Indeed, throughout its history, the petroleum industry 
has been besieged by a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, each 
individual producer must fight for its market share which in turn implies 
a constant pursuit of new concessions and reserves. For the industry as 
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a whole, this usually means a continuous expansion of potential 
capacity.32 On the other hand, given the nature of their commodity and 
the finite size of their market, these companies must constrain their 
aggregate production to 'what the market can bear' - that is, to a level 
consistent with a positive (and if possible 'optimal') rate of return. 
The need for concerted action (explicit or implicit) could not be com- 
promised, for, in the absence of output restraint, the price of oil would 
quickly collapse to the point of zero profit. Judging by its performance, 
the petroleum industry was generally successful in coordinating its 
production activity, though, over the years, the institutions underlying 
this coordination have been radically transformed. 
Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of this transformation was the 
progressive politicization of the oil business. While this process was to a 
large extent continuous, it is nevertheless possible to distinguish between 
two qualitatively different phases. The first period, roughly until the 
early 1970s, could be labelled as the 'free-flow' era in world oil - this 
in the sense that the control of oil was exercised through private owner- 
ship with political interference assuming only a secondary role (Turner, 
1983: chs 2-3). During the 1920s and 1930s, the international petroleum 
arena was all but completely dominated by the large companies, partic- 
ularly British Petroleum, Royal Dutch Shell and E ~ x o n . ~ ~  Over the 
following three decades, explicit collusion has slowly evolved into a 
broader system of complex arrangements and understandings - partly 
overt but mostly tacit - which enabled the large oil companies to main- 
tain their control of production, transportation, refining and marketing 
around the world (cf. Blair, 1976: ch. 5). However, the Second World 
War and the ensuing economic boom complicated matters for these 
firms. First, the substitution of the United States for Britain as the leading 
Western power upset the internal balance of power among the Seven 
Sisters in favour of the USbased companies, thus undermining to some 
extent their previous cohesion. Second, the growing number of inde- 
pendent producers exerted downward pressure on prices, precisely at a 
time when the rising nationalism in the Middle East and Latin America 
claimed a larger share of a shrinking markup. Threatened with loss of 
control, the large oil companies resorted to classic predatory market prac- 
tices against the independent companies, but much of their response 
was now becoming dependent on their parent governments, particularly 
that of the United States. This was manifested in a variety of measures, 
such as foreign tax credits to offset increases in royalty payments, restric- 
tions on imports into the United States of cheap oil, a CIA-backed 
coup against a hostile Iranian government and exemption from anti-trust 
prosecution. 
That the large petroleum companies have been able to achieve such 
'protection' is not entirely surprising, given their symbiotic relations with 
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Figure 4 The demise of the Petro-Core? Average profit ratios 
Source: For the Peh-Core profit, see Appendix B. Profits for the Fortune 500 are from 
The Fortune 500' (various years). Data for all US corporations are from US Internal 
Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Cmpration Income Tax Returns (various years). 
Note: Average profit ratios are derived by dividing the net profit per firm for the Petm 
Core by the corresponding figure for the Fortune 500 and for the US corporate sector as 
a whole. 
successive US administrations (cf. Tanzer, 1969; Engler, 1977). Part 
of this symbiosis is surely rooted in the strategic nature of oil, but 
that could not be the whole story, since, on many occasions, US energy 
policy in favour of the large oil firms appeared contradictory to the 
nation's material intere~t.~" Staunch defenders of the statist view like 
Krasner (1978)' solved the problem by blaming such policies on the 
'nonlogical' behaviour and 'misconceptions' of policy makers (pp. 
13-17), but there may be a much simpler explanation. Seen from an 
'instrumentalist' perspective, one may equally argue that the oil majors 
have acquired such a decisive leverage in matters of foreign policy that 
their well-being was increasingly seen as synonymous with 'national 
security'. Some indication for the source of this leverage is given in 
Figure 4. First, we compute the average profit ratio between the net 
profit earned by a 'typical' Petro-Core firm and the average profit per 
firm in the Fortune 500 cluster of companies. Then, we provide a broader 
comparison, contrasting the net profit of a 'typical' Petro-Core firm with 
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the average net profit per firm in the entire US corporate sector. Looking 
at the first of these indices, we can see that, over the past four decades, 
the Petro-Core firms were consistently enjoying earnings roughly fifteen 
times higher than the big economy's average. The second index reveals 
a far larger differential, showing that, on average, the net income of a 
Petro-Core company was tens of thousands of times larger than the corre- 
sponding earnings of a 'typical' US corporation - and if anything, that 
this differential position has improved over time. Since small firms are 
usually not organized for collective political action, their fragmented 
profits - even when very large in the aggregate - endow them with little 
or no political weight. This leaves much of the political arena open for 
the large corporations of the big economy, where, by virtue of being the 
largest profit makers, the oil companies enjoy a notable advantage. 
The era of limited flow' 
Yet impressive as it may be, the companies' ability to solicit favourable 
parent-government policies was still insufficient to reverse the onslaught 
of competitive forces. In retrospect, we can argue that since the 1960s 
there has been a growing need for 'external' force, a qualitatively new 
institutional arrangement which would bring crude production back to 
what the 'market can bear'. Historically, this institutional arrangement 
appeared in the form of OPEC and the upstream nationalization of crude 
oil. The broad causes for this transition have long been debated in the 
literature, but at least one of its consequences is fairly clear. As Adelman 
(1987) rightly points out, the cartel achieved something which, for polit- 
ical reasons, the oil companies could never have accomplished on their 
own: a dramatic increase in prices. The eighteen-fold rise in the price of 
crude oil between 1972 and 1982 would have been inconceivable under 
the 'free-flow' system of private ownership. Rapid increases of such 
magnitude require not only a tight institutional framework, but also that 
oil appears to be scarce - and given the industry's chronic excess capacity, 
that could be accomplished only through an exogenously imposed 
'crisis'. Such a crisis was possible, however, only within a new political 
realignment and that is precisely what happened: with the nationaliza- 
tion of crude oil, production decisions now moved to the offices of OPEC, 
thus opening the way for a new, 'limited-flow' regime. 
The conventional wisdom is that in shifting the locus of formal control 
from the companies to OPEC, oil was turned into an inter-state matter 
to be settled between governments. However, as we already argued, 
this convention is vulnerable, for if it were true, the large petroleum 
companies should have withered rather than consolidate their differen- 
tial profits (see Table 3 above). But there is also another reason. Had the 
oil companies indeed been displaced by producing countries, their finan- 
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cia1 performance should have diverged from OPEC's; the evidence, 
however, indicate that they have in fact converged! 
The 'limited-flow' era enriched the OPEC countries, but as we can see 
from Figure 5, that did not come on account of the oil companies. The 
figure contrasts the value of crude oil exports from OPEC countries 
(OPECcox) with the net profit earned by the Petro-Core (PC,), showing 
a rather remarkable positive correlation between them. Estimating a 
simple OLS regression between these variables for the 1 9 6 9 1  period, 
we get (f-statistics in brackets): 
Taken in a straightforward way, these estimates suggest that a one dollar 
change in exports brought a corresponding 6.7 cents change in the 
companies' net profit, and that changes in the value of exports accounted 
for almost three-quarters of the squared variations in profits. This histor- 
ical record should be interpreted with care, however. On the face of it, 
one may be tempted to infer that, by bringing much higher prices, OPEC 
was instrumental in boosting the sagging performance of the large oil 
firms. But causality seems to run both ways. While OPEC was providing 
the pretext for the crisis, there was still the need to coordinate output - 
and that it could not do on its own. As Blair (1976: 289-93) and Turner 
(1983: 90 correctly indicate, managing the immense complexity of the 
oil arena requires an overall knowledge which the OPEC countries 
lacked and which could be supplied only by the oil majors: the latter 
were of course no longer controlling output directly as producers, but 
they were now doing so indirectly, as the largest buyers, or 'offtakers' 
of crude petroleum. Interestingly, the rationale for this new alliance was 
delineated already in 1969 by the Saudi petroleum minister, Sheikh 
Yamani. 'For our part', he stated, 'we do not want the majors to lose 
their power and be forced to abandon their role as a buffer element 
between the producers and the consumers. We want the present setup 
to continue as long as possible and at all costs to avoid any disastrous 
clash of interests which would shake the foundations of the whole oil 
industry' (cited in Barnet, 1980: 61). There emerged, then, a new and 
more sophisticated realignment. The oil companies may have given up 
formal control but, within the new order, that was largely in return for 
higher profits. Perhaps the most striking expression of this 'tradeoff' is 
the experience of British Petroleum. The 1979 revolution in Iran deprived 
BP from access to 40 per cent of its global crude supplies, yet in that 
very year, its profits soared by 296 per cent - more than 
any other major company! (Turner, 1983: 204; Yergin, 1991: 684-7; The 
Fortune 500', 1978, 1979). 
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OPEC's crude oil exports ($ billion) 
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Figure 5 OPEC and the Petro-Core: conflict or convergence? 
Source: OPEC's crude oil exports are from OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1989 and 1991. 
For the net profit of the Petro-Core, see Appendix B. 
The convergence between OPEC and Western interests has long been 
suspected. On the eve of the first oil crisis, for example, Dan Smith 
suggested in an Economist survey titled The phony oil crisis' (7 July 
1973, pp. 7-38) that the American Administration may have supported 
OPEC's drive toward higher prices as a means of slowing down the 
Japanese economy (see also Terzian, 1985: 188-202; Anderson and Boyd, 
1984: chs 9-11). Another possible reason why the US government 'capit- 
ulated' and accepted separate negotiations leading to the Teheran and 
Tripoli Agreements of 1971, was that the large oil companies saw these 
as a necessary means of eviscerating the rising independents (Blair, 1976: 
ch. 9). In the words of Odell (1979: 216), there arose in the early 1970s 
an 'unholy alliance' between the large international oil companies, the 
United States and OPEC which sought to use higher prices as a way of 
boosting company profits, undermining the growth of Japan and Europe 
and forhfymg the American position in the Middle East. To these, 
Sampson (1975: 307) also added the eventual support of the British 
government, the Texas oil lobby, the independents, investors in alter- 
native sources of energy and the conservationists - all with a clear stake 
in a more expensive oil. 
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In a way, then, the oil arena has evolved in a direction opposite to 
that of the armament industry. While the military sphere of domestic 
spending and arms exports has been increasingly commercialized, the 
petroleum industry was becoming progressively politicized, both at its 
downstream and upstream segments. But as we have shown, this has 
not implied the demise of the large oil companies. Instead, the growing 
politicization of oil seems to have become a prerequisite for their survival. 
The relentless search for new reserves and the incessant proliferation of 
technology created a constant menace of excess capacity and falling 
prices. With a growing number of actors, counteracting this threat solely 
via corporate collusion became increasingly difficult and, so, eventually, 
the large companies had to integrate their private interests into a much 
broader political framework. 
5 THE 'WEAPONDOLLAR-PETRODOLLAR COALITION' 
A N D  MIDDLE EAST 'ENERGY CONFLICTS' 
The discussion so far suggests that, toward the beginning of the 1970s, 
several groups of large US-based firms saw their interests converging in 
the Middle East. The first of these groups included the large weapon 
makers of the Anna-Core who turned to the Middle East in search for 
export markets. The second cluster comprised the leading oil companies 
of the Petro-Core (including its European-based members), now driven 
toward a broader alliance with the OPEC countries. These were subse- 
quently joined by a second tier of interested parties, including 
engineering companies such as Bechtel and Fluor whose best contracts 
were increasingly those coming from the oil regions, and large financial 
institutions with a growing reliance on oil-related deposits and loans. 
Each of these groups stood to benefit from higher oil prices, but since 
none could have achieve this on its own, the solution arose through a 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition' between them. In what follows, 
we argue that, whether deliberate or not, the actions of these groups 
helped perpetuate a dynamic interaction between energy crises and mili- 
tary conflicts. In this process of 'energy conflicts', the ongoing 
militarization of the Middle East and periodic outbreaks of hostilities 
contributed toward an atmosphere of 'oil crisis', leading to higher prices 
and larger oil revenues, which in hum helped finance new weapon 
imports, thus inducing a renewed cycle of tension, hostilities and, again, 
rising energy prices. 
Our analysis of this interaction proceeds in several steps. Given the piv- 
otal role of oil prices, we begin with the issue of how they are determined 
- particularly in the context of Middle East instability. Next, we consider 
the (non-trivial) effect of crude oil prices on OPEC's oil exports and the 
oil companies' profits. From this we then move to examine the way in 
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which changes in Middle East oil revenues affected the inflow of arms 
imports. The effect of regional conflicts on the Arma-Core differed from 
their impact on the Petro-Core. Weapon makers (both in the US and else- 
where) had an obvious interest in continuous militarization which 
contributed to their current and future profits. The position of the oil com- 
panies, on the other hand, was somewhat more complicated. On the one 
hand, higher conflict-driven prices tended to boost current profits, but on 
the other they also induced long-term economic and political changes 
which could then undermine future earnings. For this reason, one might 
expect that the oil companies' support for militarization be more quali- 
fied than that of the arms contractors. This asymmetry is perhaps best 
illustrated in reference to the occurrence of major 'energy conflicts' to 
which we turn in the last part of this section. Assuming that the arma- 
ment corporations were generally supportive of regional conflicts, the 
overall position of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition should have 
then hinged on the particular stance taken by the oil majors. Specifically, 
we would expect the Coalition to be divided when the oil companies are 
doing relatively well, but unified in favour of conflict when oil profits are 
down. And, indeed, this hypothesis seems consistent with the data. Using 
the differential profit position of the Petro-Core as a proxy for its stance 
toward 'energy conflicts', we fmd this to be a surprisingly accurate pre- 
dictor for the outbreak of Middle East hostilities. 
Scarcity, anxiety and the price of oil 
The common perception is that, in one way or another, the price of crude 
petroleum depends on its underlying 'scarcity'. From this vantage point, 
it is then often argued that OPEC's early success hinged on rapid Western 
growth and the consequent buildup of 'excess demand' for oil during the 
1960s and 1970s. Similarly, the cartel's difficulties since the early 1980s 
are often associated with lower industrial growth and improved energy 
efficiency which exacerbated the spectre of 'excess supply'. Despite its 
popularity, however, this view is vulnerable on several grounds. 
First, there are conceptual problems. The notion that prices are affected 
by 'scarcity' is meaningful when supply is Limited by natural or techno- 
logical circumstances, but that has not been the case in the oil industry. 
From a long-term perspective, the relevant proxy for scarcity is the ratio 
of proven reserves to current production. Over the past quarter century, 
this ratio rose by a quarter - from about 30 production years in the mid- 
1960s, to over 40 production years by the early 1 9 9 0 ~ ~ ~  - and according 
to the 'scarcity thesis', this should have brought prices down. However, 
the facts of the matter are that, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the real 
price of crude oil was three to four times higher than what it was in the 
1960s (see Figure 6 below) - an increase which must hence be ascribed to 
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institutional factors. The concept of scarcity is not much more meaning- 
ful in the context of short-term fluctuations. The problem here arises 
because the oil industry commonly operates far below capacity (as given 
by available facilities and technological know-how), so to the extent that 
prices do respond to the 'shortfall' in supply, the relationship must be 
attributed, at least in part, to the collusive behaviour of sellers. 
The second problem with the 'scarcity thesis' is that there is very little 
in the way of empirical evidence to support it. To illustrate these diffi- 
culties, we contrast in Figure 6 the real price of crude oil (denominated 
in constant 1987 dollars) with the relative excess of global consumption 
over global production (measured as a per cent of the average of the 
two). The latter variable reflects changes in inventories, with negative 
values representing a buildup and positive values denoting depletion. 
Now, if excess consumption indicates a 'shortage' caused by insufficient 
output, and excess production represents the arrival of 'distress oil' and 
thus a condition of 'glut', then we should expect prices to rise in the 
former case and fall in the latter. This, however, is not what we see in 
the chart. In fact, the historical comparison does not betray any system- 
atic relationship between 'scarcity' and price movement. During the 
1960s, there was an ongoing erosion in the real price of crude oil which 
appears consistent with the persistent buildup of inventories over the 
same period. Yet, this very situation was also the backdrop for the price 
explosion of the early 1970s! The average real price of oil climbed by 20 
per cent in 1971, 10 per cent in 1972, 34 per cent in 1973, and then by 
233 per cent in 1974 - but contrary to the excess-demand rationale, the 
figure shows that these increases were accompanied by rising, not falling 
in~entories.~~ Indeed, according to Blair (1976: 266-8), the crisis could 
have had nothing to do with any real shortage of oil, simply because 
there was no such shortage to begin with. Early in 1973, the ARAMCO 
companies were explicitly warned by Saudi Arabia of a pending 
Egyptian attack on Israel and the possible use of the oil weapon (see 
also Sampson, 1975: 244-5). Anticipating the consequences, they raised 
production in the first three-quarters of the year and that fully com- 
pensated for the eventual drop in the last quarter. All in all, OPEC 
production for 1973 amounted to 11.0 billion barrels, which was in fact 
slightly higher than the 10.8 billion it should have been based on long- 
term projections! (Blair, 1976: 266 fn). The apparent lack of any clear 
relationship between scarcity and price movement continued throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s. Between 1975 and 1978, the difference between 
production and consumption fluctuated widely, but that seemed to 
have little or no bearing on the real price of oil. On the other hand, 
production exceeded consumption in both 1979 and 1980, but instead of 
bringing a price decline, this was associated with a second price explo- 
sion, with the real price of oil rising by 25 per cent and 52 per cent, 
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Figure 6 'Scarcity' and the real price of oil 
Source: Gude oil prices are from the I W s  International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1986, 
pp. 1704; 1991, p. 179. GDP price deflator is from USCongress, Economic Report of the 
President (1993), Table B-3, p. 352. Data for world production and consumption of crude 
oil are from BP Statistical Review of World Energy (various years). 
Note: Crude oil prices for 1960-84 are given by the price of Saudi Arabia Light (Ras 
Tanura), and for 1985-90 by the average world spot price. The 'real' price of oil is obtained 
by dividing the nominal figures by the USGDP implicit price deflator. 'Excess 
consumption' and production of crude oil, divided by the average of the two. 
respectively. Finally, during the 1980s there was a progressive depletion 
of inventories, yet that was correlated initially with rapidly declining 
and then stagnating prices. The Gulf Crisis of 1990/91 brought a substan- 
tial rise in prices which at one point reached $40 per barrel (current 
dollars), but never during that period was there any meaningful shortage 
of oil, as Saudi Arabia and the oil companies offset the shortfall from 
Iraq and Kuwait.37 One may correctly argue, of course, that the differ- 
ence between consumption and production is not necessarily a very good 
proxy for excess demand. Strictly speaking, demand is given by the sum 
of consumption and the desired change in inventories, so excess demand 
should be approximated not by the overall change in inventories, but 
rather by the undesired part of that change. Unfortunately, the latter is 
not an observable quantity, which tends to further weaken the practical 
usefulness of excess demand and supply explanations. 
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Finally, even if we choose to neglect these problems, the divergencies 
between production and consumption seem too small to warrant the 
dramatic price variations of the last two decades. Looking at the rela- 
tive magnitude of production and consumption in Figure 6, we can see 
that, since the early 1960s, the average difference between them was less 
than 2 per cent above or below the overall volume of world output. But 
then there arises the question of how could such relatively insignificant 
discrepancies account for dramatic real-price fluctuations of tens or even 
hundreds of per cent per annum? 
The solution for these perplexities lies in a reinterpretation of 'scarcityf. 
As a speculative commodity, the price of crude petroleum depends not 
only on the relationship between current production and consumption, 
but also - and often much more so - on future expectations. The prices 
buyers are willing to pay depend not only on present energy needs and 
the cost of alternative substitutes, but also on expected future prices. 
Similarly, sellers (both individually and as a group) are constantly 
weighing the tradeoff between present incomes and anticipated but 
unknown future revenues. Moreover, these factors are not independent 
of each other. Indeed, buyersf willingness to pay is often affected by the 
apparent resolve of sellers, which is in turn influenced by the extent of 
consumersf anxiety. Once acknowledged, such intricacies imply that a 
given consumption/production vector can be associated with a host of 
different prices, depending in a rather complex way on the nature of 
future expectations. 
The significance of these considerations could hardly be overstated. 
To illustrate this, consider the fact that after the emergence of OPEC, 
the number of primary industry players has grown appreciably - from 
less than a dozen in the 1960s, to over 150 by the late 1970s, according 
to one estimate (Odell, 1979: 182) - and that still without counting 
governments. Such multiplicity should have undermined the industry's 
ability to coordinate output, but that is not what arises from our analysis 
in this and the previous section. Indeed, if we were to judge on the basis 
of OPEC's revenues and the companiesf profits (see Table 3 and Figure 
5), it would appear that collective action was in fact more effective with 
hundreds of participants during the 1970s and 1980s, than with only a 
handful before the onset of the crisis! The reason for this apparent 
anomaly is that, in the final analysis, the price of oil - on the open market 
but also between long-term partners - depends not only on the ability 
to limit current output to 'what the market can bear', but also on the 
nature of perceived scarcity associated with 'external' circumstances. We 
submit that, since the early 1970s, the single most important factor 
affecting these perceptions was the vulnerability of Middle East supplies. 
The importance of Middle East oil is not new, of course, but this 
signhcance has increased substantially since the Second World War, 
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Figure 7 Crude oil prices (annual average) 
Source: See Figure 6. 
Note: Crude oil prices for 1960-84 are given by the price of Saudi Arabian Light (Ras 
Tanura), and for 1985-90 by the average world spot price. The 'real' price of oil is obtained 
by dividing the nominal figures by the US GDP implicit price deflator. 
particularly since the 1960s. In 1972, on the eve of the first oil crisis, the 
region accounted for 36 per cent of the world's total production and 62 
per cent of its proven reserves, up from 12 per cent and 42 per cent, 
respectively, in 1948.38 But as they were becoming more crucial, the 
region's oil supplies were also growing more vulnerable. The oil 'prize' 
acted like a magnate, turning the Middle East into a focal centre of super- 
power confrontation, and together with rising nationalism, this brought 
instability and armed conflict. The consequences for oil were twofold. 
First, the region's ongoing militarization since the late 1960s has created 
a constant threat for future energy supplies, which helped maintain prices 
even in the absence of tight producer coordination. Second, the occa- 
sional outbreak of a major conflict tended to trigger an atmosphere of 
immediate 'energy crisis', with the effect of inducing confident sellers to 
demand and fearing buyers to accept much higher prices. The potential 
significance of these factors is suggested in Figure 7, where we relate 
the price of crude oil (in current and constant dollars) to the outbreak 
of major 'energy conflicts'. The chart indicates that since 1973 it was 
open hostilities which perhaps more than anything else affected the 
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course of oil prices. Despite the absence of any real shortage, the onset 
of these wars generated a crisis atmosphere which was sufficient to create 
a fear of shortage and cause prices to rise. Similarly, the diffusion of a 
'crisis' - either at the end of a war, or when it became clear that its 
continuation posed no danger to the flow of oil - the price began to 
stagnate or fall. These aspects of the 'limited-flow' regime have been so 
thoroughly institutionalized, that they eventually became embedded 
in common jargon: the industry's 'price consensus' now customarily 
incorporates, in addition to its 'peacetime' basis, also such items as 
'embargo effects' and 'war premiums'.39 The precise magnitude of such 
premiums cannot be easily determined, of course, but their signhcance 
seems beyond dispute. 
Oil prices, oil revenues and oil profits 
How have higher crude oil prices affected the fortunes of OPEC and the 
oil companies? The answer to this question is not as trivial as it may 
initially appear. First, in the case of OPEC, the value of oil exports is 
given by the product of quantity and price, so this value should be posi- 
tively correlated with prices only to the extent that the demand for 
OPEC's oil is price-inelastic.' Second, for the integrated oil companies, 
there is the added complication that profits in downstream operations 
are affected negatively by an increase in the price of crude oil inputs. 
As a consequence, the relationships between oil prices and oil earnings 
have not always been positive; it was only with the energy crises of the 
last quarter century that higher crude oil prices seem to have had a net 
positive effect on both OPEC's exports and the companies' profits. 
This impact is illustrated in Figure 8, where we contrast the world 
price of crude oil on the horizontal axis, with the value of OPEC's oil 
exports and with the net profits of the Petro-Core both on the vertical 
axis (all in logarithmic terms). The data clearly demonstrate the shift 
which occurred toward the early 1970s from a 'free-flow' to a 'limited- 
flow' regime. For OPEC, oil exports were negatively correlated with oil 
prices until 1970, and positively correlated with them thereafter - a 
pattern which is similarly replicated in the relationship between oil 
prices and the net profits of the Petro-Core. During the 1960s, oil prices 
were generally falling, but given the rapid expansion in the demand for 
crude oil and petroleum products, OPEC's exports and the companies' 
profits were nevertheless rising. However, since such increases were 
inherently limited by the expansion in consumption, faster income 
growth could have been achieved only with a new era of crisis and much 
higher prices. And as we can see, since 1970, the price of crude oil became 
a prime determinant of both OPEC's exports and the companies' profits. 
Of course, neither of these groups was necessarily interested in the 
THE WEAPONDOLLAR-PETRODOLLAR COALITION 
Exports and Profits ($ bill., log scale) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
< - 
&>*- - 
C 
- < - 
< * 
- 
- 
D. - 
- 
- 
- 
-8 - 
90 
- 70 - ,A'  
. :  = .  
- i- m  .- 1 
- i . m  rn W m *  
1: 
- 
- %60 
- OPEC Oil Exports 
- Petro-Core Profits 
I  I  I  I  I  I I I I  I  I  I I I I I I  
10 100 
Crude Oil Price ($/bbl.. log scale) 
Figure 8 From a 'free flow' to a 'limited flow': oil prices, exports and profits, 
1960-90 
Source: Crude oil prices are from the IMPS International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1986, 
pp. 170-1; 1991, p. 179. OPEC's crude oil exports are from OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 
1989 and 1991. For net profit of the Petro-Core, see Appendix B. 
Note: Crude oil prices for 1960-84 are given by the price of Saudi Arabian light (Ras 
Tanura), and for 1985-90 by the average world spot price. 
highest possible prices. Indeed, in the long run, expensive oil encour- 
ages energy conservation and improved energy efficiency, diverts 
attention to alternative energy sources and lowers entry barriers into the 
industry. More broadly, excessively high prices may lead to an 
unfavourable political climate in Western countries which can then 
undermine the subtle relationship between OPEC and the oil companies. 
But to the extent that OPEC and the companies did seek to raise their 
current exports and profits, this was now dependent on higher conflict- 
driven prices. Similarly, when lower conflict premiums brought the price 
of crude oil down, they also reduced the magnitude of oil exports and 
profits. 
From oil exports to arms imports 
The link from tension and conflict to larger oil revenues and profits was 
not unidirectional, however. Reversing the sequence, we can equally 
argue that higher petroleum exports helped finance military imports, 
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Figure 9 Middle East oil income and arms imports, 1964-89 ($ billion, 1987 
prices) 
Source: Middle East income for the 1964-78 period is computed from American Petroleum 
Institute data (as reported in Bii, 1985, Table 27, pp. 131-2) and from BP Statisticnl Ran'ew 
of World Energy (various years); for the 197!+89 period, income is assumed equal to the 
region's oil exports, taken from the U.N. Statisticnl Yearbook (various years). Arms imports 
are from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Milifay Expenditures and 
Arms Trade (various years). Both current price series are deflated by the USGDPprice 
deflator from US Congress, Economic Report of the Presidenf;l993, Table B3, p. 352. 
thus further fuelling the regional arms race. This side of the oil-arms 
interaction is examined in Figure 9 and Table 4. In the chart, we contrast 
the annual value of arms-import deliveries to the Middle East with the 
region's aggregate oil income three years earlier (both in constant 
dollars). The reason is that current oil income bears on the value of 
current military contracts, but the weapons are usually delivered later, 
with an average lag of about three years. The association depicted here 
is very clear. During the period until the late 1960s, there was a slow 
advance of oil incomes and only a marginal increase in arms imports. 
Both superpowers were still preoccupied with Europe and the Far East, 
and their limited weapon shipments to the Middle East were largely in 
the form of military assistance. But since the early 1970~~ with the 
increasing commercialization of arms exports and the growing focus on 
Middle Eastern purchasing power, things began to change. In retrospect, 
we can see how during the next two decades arms imports to the region 
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- from the two superpowers as well as numerous other suppliers - 
were increasingly financed by oil exports, and with a rather startling 
reg~lar i ty .~~ 
The relationship between arms imports and oil incomes over the 
1964-89 period could be expressed in the form of two alternative linear 
models. such that 
( 1 )  a m s  imports, = a ,  064-72, + a,  073-89, 
+ p, 064-72, oil income, + p, 073-89, oil income,, 
+ U t  
(2) In a m s  imports, = T, 064-72, + T, 073-89, 
+ 6, 064-72, In (oil income), + 6,073-89, In (oil income),, 
+ vt 
where amzs imports denotes the aggregate dollar value of arms flowing 
into the Middle East, oil income is the aggregate income from the region's 
petroleum exports, 064-72 is a dummy variable which is equal to unity 
between 1964 and 1972 and zero thereafter, 073-89 is a complementary 
dummy which is equal to zero between 1964 and 1972 and one after- 
ward, {a,}, {B,.}, {T~} and {ai} are unknown parameters to be estimated, 
and u and v are unknown error terms. 
The first model expresses arms imports as a function of lagged oil 
income (both in constant dollars), with slope coefficients denoting 
estimated marginal propensities to import arms from oil income. The 
second model is estimated using natural logarithms for the two vari- 
ables, so the coefficients approximate the oil income elasticity of arms 
imports. In both cases, we idenhfy 1972/73 as denoting a structural 
change in the underlying relationship, associated with the shift from the 
relatively tranquil 'free-flow' regime of world oil, to the 'limited-flow' 
era of armed conflict and energy crises. Given this change, we use 
dummy variables to estimate the intercepts and slope parameters twice 
- initially for the 1964-72 period and then for 1973-89. 
Regression results for the two models are given in Table 4. In the first 
period, between 1964 and 1972, oil income seemed to have had a large 
impact on arms imports. Taken at face value, the estimates indicate that 
almost 61 per cent of the region's additional oil income went to the 
purchase of imported arms, with a 1 per cent rise in that income bringing 
three years later a 2.3 per cent increase in arms shipments (these esti- 
mates are probably overstated since part of the weaponry was delivered 
as aid). During the second period, from 1973 to 1989, the rise in oil 
incomes prompted a general increase in the demand for commodities, 
so arms sales to the region now had to compete with imported civilian 
goods. This brought a substantial decline in the parameters: the propen- 
sity to purchase arms from additional oil income fell to about 6 per cent, 
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Table 4 OLS estimates for the determinants of Middle East arms imports 
(annual data, 1964-89) 
Independent variable Dependent variable 
arms imports, In (arms imports), 
064-72, oil income, - , 0.606 
(1.68) 
D73-89, oil income, - , 0.058 
(8.15)+ 
064-72, In (oil income), - , 
073-89, In (oil income), -, 
R2 
Adj. R2 
F-statistics 
DW 
Note: t-statistics are in brackets; for data sources, see Figure 9. 
+ P c .001 (two-tailed test) 
and the oil-elasticity of arms imports declined to 0.34. Relative to the 
pre-1973 period, the new relationship meant that the same increase in 
military imports now required a much larger increase in oil revenues - 
and that is exactly what happened. The absolute changes in oil income 
became far greater, causing arms imports to rise rapidly until 1983, and 
then fall substantially with declining revenues thereafter. 
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about these regressions, however, 
is their 'explanatory power', particularly for the post-1973 period: as it 
turns out, knowing the oil income of Middle East counties is almost all 
we need in order to predict the overall value of arms deliveries three 
years later!" Arms deliveries into the region were of course affected by 
numerous factors - domestic tensions and inter-country conflicts, super- 
power policies to protect and enhance their sphere of influence, and the 
evolution of domestic arms production, to name only a few. Furthermore, 
some arms deliveries were financed by aid or loans, so their importation 
was not directly dependent on oil revenues. Yet, based on our results, it 
would seem that these factors were either marginal, or themselves corol- 
laries of the ebb and flow of the 'great prize' - oil. 
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Differential accumulation and the outbreak of 
'energy conflicts' 
We have now reached the final step of our journey, ready to move from 
means to ends. Our method in this exploration was to progressively 
distil the interactive purchases and sales of oil and arms down to their 
primal driving force - that is, to the differential accumulation of capital 
by the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition. The task now is to formu- 
late the general contours of this process. In doing so, it is convenient, 
at least for the time being, to leave the state and foreign policy out of 
the picture and focus solely on the large h s .  The question then is 
twofold. First, assuming that these companies behaved as 'rationale 
actors' engaged in collective action, how would their quest for differ- 
ential accumulation bear on the mechanism of Middle East militarization 
and 'energy conflicts'? And, second, is this mechanism consistent with 
the historical record? We turn to deal with these questions now. 
The large oil companies and the leading arms makers both gained 
from Middle East 'energy conflicts' - the first through higher conflict 
premiums and the latter via larger military orders. But beyond this 
common interest the positions of these groups differed in certain impor- 
tant respects. For the Arma-Core, the benefits from conflict would come 
in two stages: initially in the form of pre-conflict military buildups and 
subsequently through the positive effect on future arms deliveries of 
higher conflict-driven petroleum revenues. Furthermore, as long as the 
arms sellers succeeded in avoiding price competition (as they did until 
the early 1990s), the 'demand-pull' increase in deliveries would be 
accompanied by a rise in the price of weapon systems, thus further 
augmenting the value of arms exports.43 Overall, 'energy conflicts' 
tended to boost arms exports both in the short-run and long-run, and 
given that the weapon makers have had an open-ended interest in such 
sales (Brzoska and Ohlson, 1987: 54), their support for these conflicts 
should have been more or less unq~al if ied.~ 
For the Petro-Core, however, the calculations are probably more 
subtle. As we argued above, the effect on their profits of higher war- 
premiums would be positive only up to a certain point. Furthermore, 
the outcome of regional conflicts is not entirely predictable and carries 
the inherent danger of undermining their intricate relations with host 
governments. For these reasons, we should expect the large oil com- 
panies to have a more qualified view on the desirability of open Middle 
East hostilities. Specifically, as long as their financial performance is 
deemed satisfactory, the Petro-Core members would prefer the status 
quo of tension-without-war. When their profits wither, however, the 
companies' outlook is bound to become more hawkish, seeking to boost 
income via a conflict-driven 'energy crisis'. 
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Now, if capital accumulation is indeed the fundamental driving force 
lying at the root of both global business and international politics, then 
we should expect events in the Middle East to mirror these dynamics. 
In general, the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition converged around 
the common interest of higher oil prices. The mechanism of achieving 
this involved the ongoing militarization of the Middle East and that was 
supported by all members of the Coalition, particularly since the early 
1970s. When it came to open military hostilities, however, the Coalition's 
stance was not always unanimous. The Arma-Core members were gener- 
ally in favour, but given the contingent outlook of the Petro-Core, a 
unified support for conflict depended crucially on the profit performance 
of the large oil companies. 
And indeed, these speculations receive an astounding confirmation 
from the unfolding of events over the past quarter century. An overview 
of these events is provided in reference to Figures 10a and lob. 
Underlying the logic of these charts is again the emphasis on relative 
business performance. To reiterate, in the context of large-scale business 
enterprise, the quest for power is commonly incarnated in the goal of 
differential pecuniary accumulation, which in turn dictates a constant 
attempt to exceed the so-called 'normal' rate of return. Within the big 
economy, this 'normal' usually means the average recorded by some 
well-publicized index, such as the Fortune 500 listing. The owners and 
managers of the large firms - including the major oil companies - contin- 
uously weigh their own rate of profit against this or similar average. 
The result of such comparisons constitute the final yardstick for success 
- or in the case of failure, a signal for remedial action. With this in mind, 
our analysis below focuses on contrasting the net rate of return on equity 
for the Petro-Core with the corresponding rate recorded by the Fortune 
500 group of companies. 
This differential process is reproduced in Figure 10a, where we chart 
the Petro-Core performance against that of the Fortune 500 over the 
1966-91 period. Particularly significance are the dark areas which denote 
incidences when the rate of return for the Petro-Core fell short of the 
Fortune 500 'normal'. In Figure lob, we present an alternative display 
of these data - by computing the difference between the Petro-Core and 
Fortune 500 rates as a percentage of the latter. Here, too, we darken 
those years in which the oil companies' performance was inferior to their 
Fortune 500 benchmark. Our hypothesis in looking at these charts is 
simple. As long as the Petro-Core's rate of return exceeds the big 
economy's average, the oil companies' performance will appear satis- 
factory or even superior, leading to a moderate stance on Middle Eastern 
affairs. When their performance falls below the 'normal', however, we 
enter the so-called 'danger zone': for the Petro-Core, the status quo of 
non-violent tension is no longer sufficient and open hostilities become 
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Figure 10a Rate of return on equity: the Fortune 500 and Petro-Core, 1960-91 
Figure 10b Petro-Core profit differentials and Middle East 'energy conflicts' 
Source: For the Petro-Core profit, see Appendix B. Profits for the F o h e  500 are from 
The Fortune 500' (various years). 
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increasingly appealing. This shift brings the entire Weapondollar- 
Petrodollar Coalition into a unified focus in favour of a new 'energy 
conflict'. 
Examining the two charts, three unbroken regularities become 
apparent. First, we can see that since the mid-1960s every 'danger 
zone' was followed by an outbreak of Middle East 'energy conflict' 
(designated by an 'explosion' symbol in Figure lob). Thus, in 1966, the 
performance of the Petro-Core fell below that of the Fortune 500, which 
was then followed by the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. The Petro-Core 
entered the 'danger zone' again in 1972, and that was followed by the 
Arab-Israeli War of 1973. The next 'danger zone' developed in 1977 and 
1978, followed by the Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis of 1979, and 
then by the Iraq-Iran War which began in 1980. The most recent 
'danger zone' opened in 1986, followed by the intensification of the 
Iraq-Iran War and eventually culminating in the Gulf War of 1990/91. 
The second observation is that subsequent to the outbreak of each of 
these conflicts, the Petro-Core's rate of return moved to surpass or at 
least match the Fortune 500 average. And, finally, we can see that no 
'energy conflict' erupted without the Petro-Core first falling into a 
'danger zone'. 
6 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Given the complexity of Middle Eastern affairs, these regularities appear 
almost too systematic to be true. Indeed, is it possible that the differ- 
ential rate of return of six oil companies is all that one needed in order 
to predict such major upheavals as June 1967 War, the Iraq-Iran conflict 
or the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait? And what should we make of the notion 
that Middle East conflicts were the main factor 'regulating' the differ- 
ential accumulation of the Petro-Core? Finally, are lower- than-normal 
earnings for the oil majors indeed a necessary condition for Middle East 
energy wars? Maybe the picture emerging from data in Figures 10a and 
lob is more of a coincidence, a statistical mirage with little relevance to 
the underlying events? 
The answers to these questions are not simple and for a very good 
reason. In the social sciences, a hypothesis or 'model' is much like a 
'condensed narrative', a short story bursting out of a voluminous novel 
with endless interactions and multilayer plots. However, as Carr 
(1961: ch. 1) rightly argues, the particular way in which this story is told, 
the choice of actors and the choreography of events, are not really open 
to objective assessment. Much like theatre, human history - whether we 
call it 'literature', 'political economy', or 'international relations' - has 
very few objective rules, and its subject and method are often dictated 
by convention and fashion. 
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The hypotheses presented in this paper are not free of such biases. 
Nevertheless, these hypotheses are neither deductive, nor rooted in a 
fictitious framework. They emerge from a systematic attempt to confront 
the varied interpretations and perspectives written over the years into 
the historical Rashomon of the Middle East. Our own version offers a 
series of short, somewhat violent stories which focus on a process 
and actors that until now have been marginalized by the mainstream of 
international political economy - the accumulation of capital and the multi- 
national corporation. 
The interaction of weapondollars and petrodollars in the Middle East 
provides an interesting insight into the growing welding of global poli- 
tics and business. Arms exports, which were previously used as a 
primary foreign policy tool, have undergone a gradual commercializution, 
whereas oil imports, which hitherto belonged to the business sphere, 
have been increasingly politicized. The process urufying these two spheres 
is the quest for power via differential capital accumulation. The various 
indices of differential accumulation are not mere theoretical constructs, 
but rather a primary focus of both business and government managers. 
Indeed, it is through the differential pace of accumulation - the growth 
of one's own profits relative to the average or 'normal' - that global 
politics and business are now increasingly evaluated. With time, as the 
means of economic and political power grow more sophisticated, the 
indices of power become more abstract - eventually reduced to feeble 
electronic signals flickering on computer screens. But that only hastens 
their standardization as universal codes of conduct, idealizations of 
latent power which will steer our entry into the twenty-first century. 
This conclusion bears on the basic debate in international political 
economy. Note that, as it stands, the emphasis on differential accumu- 
lation does not necessarily negate the significance of other material and 
ideal considerations, nor does it eliminate the role played by non-corpo- 
rate actors and governments. For instance, those who emphasize the 
primacy of 'societal groups' could interpret our findings as evidence for 
the unbalanced impact of oil and armament corporations on the foreign 
policy of the United States. More 'instrumentalist' observers (such as 
Blair and Domhoff, for example) may interpret Middle East develop 
ments as a clear case of several key groups manipulating the state for 
their own purpose. The Marxist school of 'monopoly capital' (as elabo- 
rated by Magdoff, for instance) could idenhfy the changes occurring in 
the Middle East since the 1970s as part of a neo-imperialist response to 
a realignment in the international structure of power. Specifically, it may 
be argued that the primacy of arms exports in US foreign policy emerged 
not from the need to 'contain communism' or a desire to offset excess 
capacity, but rather from the pressing imperative to counteract the 
competitive decline of US business vis-a-vis European and Japanese 
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firms. Finally, adherents to the statist view (like Krasner) may take both 
the Middle East arms race and the roller coaster of oil prices as part of 
a state-centred competition between the old European powers and the 
post-war superpowers. This competition, they may argue, together with 
growing Middle East nationalism gave rise to repeated military conflicts 
and oil crises in which the large multinational corporations were some- 
times used to support statist interests. 
But will these generalization stand closer scrutiny? If differential 
capital accumulation is indeed a necessary component of international 
political economy, could it be reconciled with all of its principal 
schools? Which (if any) of its main frameworks - statist, liberal and 
Marxist - is inconsistent with the emphasis on differential accumulation 
as the primary power index and main driving force? In the context 
of the Middle East and the interaction between oil and arms, how well 
does each of these approaches stand together with or in contrast to our 
empirical findings? These questions remain to be answered. 
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1 On the differences between the 'structuralist', 'functionalist' and 'instru- 
mentalists' interpretations within the Marxist literature on the state, see Isaac 
(1987: ch. 5) and Caporaso and Levine (1992: ch. 8). 
2 This attempt to get to the essence of things may be comparable to the 
Weberian search for 'ideal types', or Marx's method of 'abstraction' (as 
described for example in Sweezy, 1942, p. 16). 
3 The discussion in this and the following two subsections draws on the more 
elaborate analysis in Nitzan (1992). 
4 The notion that 'primitive' societies are marked by cooperation, as opposed 
to 'civilized' societies which are driven by power is elaborated in Mumford 
(1967, 1970). 
5 We are of course aware of the literature dealing with the goals of the firmI 
where notions such as 'stability', 'sales maximization', 'social image' and 
alike are often cited as alternative corporate targets (see for example Scherer 
and Ross, 1990: 38-52). It is our view, however, that such goals are at best 
subsidiary and could not for long conflict with the overridkg profit imper- 
ative. 
6 Higher profits are often associated with higher consumption, but the latter 
is more a corollary than a primary goal. Furthermore, profit-induced 
consumption is usually conspicuous in nature - that is, aimed at establishing 
a differenti status. This is highly important, because once we move into 
the realm of conspicuous consumption, the notion of 'real profit' assumes 
an entirely different meaning: higher prices, which from a utilitarian 
perspective imply a lower real income, for the conspicuous consumer often 
mean the exact opposite, since they bestow a higher differential status! 
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7 This line of analysis has been elaborated by later writers, such as Baran 
and Sweezy (1966), Magdoff (1%9), O'Connor (19731, Gold (1977) and 
Arnin (1976), who also linked it with the economic and cultural expansion 
of capitalism into Third World countries, primarily in quest for raw rnate- 
rials and cheaper labour. For a summary of these issues, see Szymanski 
(1981). 
8 Note that these considerations are based only on DoD prime contracts and 
ignore the impact of subcontracting, foreign military sales and contracts 
awarded by NASA and the Department of Energy. However, since the 
largest prime contractors for the DoD are also the biggest subcontractors 
and foreign sellers, as well as the leaders in space and nuclear technology, 
we can safely assume that the inclusion of these additional categories will 
have no significant bearing on our classification. 
9 Excluded from the sample is Hughes Aircraft which, as a privately-held firm 
until 1986, did not publish financial reports. Also omitted are General Motors 
which entered the Arma-Core only in 1986 after acquiring Hughes Aircraft; 
LTV which filed for bankruptcy protection in 1986; and Tenneco whose 
annual contract awards fluctuated widely. 
10 The notion of the 'big economy' refers to the cluster of several hundred very 
large oligopolistic firms which dominate the modem business sector. In the 
United States, the dichotomy between the 'big' and 'small' economies began 
to appear with the early rise of 'big business' during the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, and since then was further shaped and reshaped through 
successive waves of mergers and acquisitions. Although this process was 
already identified by Veblen (1904), it was only with the turbulence of the 
Great Depression that economists started to analyse it more systematically. 
For recent contributions to this literature, see for example Averitt (1968), 
Edwards (1979) and Bowring (1986). 
11 The main problem is that most of the large defence contractors operate as 
conglomerates with civilian as well as military lines of business. Their profit 
data, however, are rarely broken in a similar manner, and even when they 
are, the classification is usually based on accounting conventions rather than 
economic considerations. 
12 For example, according to Business Week, in 1984, the military sales of Boeing 
accounted for 40 per cent of its sales revenues but 80 per cent of its net 
income (The military buildup at Boeing', 11 March 1985, p. 46). Similarly, 
in the third quarter of 1986, General Motors suffered an operating loss of 
$339 million on its automobile production, but thanks to the military sales 
of Hughes Aircraft and EDS, and to the financial gains from GM Acceptance, 
the overall profit was positive ('GM's big operating loss', Business Week, 3 
November 1986, p. 36). Governmental audits often suggest that military 
production is more profitable than civilian production. Thus, when the 
House Appropriation Committee considered halting the F-18 programme, 
there emerged the fact that sales of military aircraft generated half the 
revenues of McDonnell-Douglas, but all of the company's profits. Or, an 
audit of some 8,000 contracts between the Pentagon and General Electric (in 
effect during the 1976-83 period) revealed an average rate of profit of 25 
per cent, substantially higher than the corresponding average for the 
company's commercial business ('Cracking down on contractors', Time, 8 
April 1985, p. 14). Unfortunately, such studies are too infrequent and not 
sufficiently comprehensive. One may be tempted to solve the problem indi- 
rectly, by regressing overall profits against sales originated from distinct 
lines of business. The estimated coefficients could then be interpreted as the 
ARTICLES 
respective profit markups, and used to impute the relative contribution to 
profit of each line of business. However, this method breaks down once we 
allow profit margins to vary over time. 
Strictly speaking, the big economy includes more than the Fortune 500 group 
of companies. The latter contains only those firms which derive at least half 
of their sales from either manufacturing or mining, but there are many other 
very large corporations which rely more heavily on banking, finance, utili- 
ties, services, transportation or retailing, or that are simply too diversified 
to be classified as belonging to any single category. To these, one must 
further add the large privately-held companies for which financial data are 
commonly unavailable. However, given that the Fortune 500 group still 
comprises most of the largest US-based firms, using it as a tentative proxy 
for the big economy is not unreasonable. 
To the extent that this assumption is inaccurate, the index would over- 
estimate the dependency of the Fortune 500 sales on defence contract awards. 
While the sixteen firm sample comprises a fixed group of companies, the 
composition of the Fortune 500 list varies each year. However, the changes 
here occur primarily at the bottom of the list, so the impact of the changing 
population does not have a marked effect on the ratio. Clearly, mergers and 
acquisitions affect both the denominator and numerator of our figures in 
much the same way. 
Computed from Commission of the European Communities, Directorate- 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs (1992) European Economy, No. 51, 
May, Table 5, p. 185. 
Citibase (1990), p. X-1-1, Table 1 .l, series GNP and p. X41 ,  Table 4.1, series 
GEX and GIM. 
Calculated from data published by the International Monetary Fund, in its 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1979, p. 62; and 1993, p. 109. 
The figures are for book value at year-end. Data are from the US Bureau of 
the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979 (100th edn), Table 
1496, p. 850; and 1991 (111th edn), Table 1388, p. 793. 
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1986) The 
National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-82, Statistical 
Tables, p. 310, Table 6.21B, and US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1992, p. 542, Table 872. Note 
that, since these figures include the profits of all firms, they tend to under- 
estimate the dependency on foreign profit by the large corporations which 
account for most US direct foreign investments. 
Over the past three decades, there was a persistent decline in the ranking of 
the large US-based corporations relative to their foreign-based counterparts: 
in 1960, there were 114 US firms among the world's 174 largest companies in 
15 major industries but, by 1990, the United States was home to only 56 of 
the world's 176 largest corporations (calculated from data in Franko, 1991). 
Confronted with growing global competition, many US-based companies 
which during the first half of the twentieth century were undisputed world 
leaders in civilian markets, increasingly retreated to government-sheltered 
areas such as defence, nuclear energy and medical-related technologies. In the 
electronics industry, for instance, General Electric embarked on a major 
restructuring programme which, over the 1981-7 period, involved acquiring 
some 338 business and product lines and divesting 232 others ('General 
Electric is stalking big game again', Business Week, 16 March 1987, pp. 112-13). 
The process, whose main goal was to divert from markets dominated by the 
Japanese, involved among other things, the 1985 acquisition of RCA (partic- 
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ularly for the latter's defence business) and the 1986 'swap' of GE's consurner- 
electronic lines with Thornson's medical-equipment unit ('A reunion of 
technological Titans', Time, 23 December 1985, pp. 50ff, and 'Jumping Jack 
strikes again', Time, 3 August 1987, pp. 33). In 1992, General Electric sold its 
defence electronics unit to Martin Marietta, but in turn became a major share- 
holder of the latter company ('This deal could send Martin Marietta into 
orbit', Business Week, 7 December 1992, p. 35). In the aircraft industry, 
Lockheed left commercial aviation altogether after its entanglement with the 
L-1011 airliner almost brought it to bankruptcy. Similarly, McDonnell- 
Douglas, which was initially created in 1967 when McDonnell absorbed 
Douglas as a means of diversrfying into non-defence activity, never made any 
money from civilian aircraft and, in 1991, entered into a tentative agreement 
to sell 40 per cent of its civilian airline unit to Taiwan Aerospace ('A dogfight 
could nick the El&, Business Week, 14 February 1983, pp. 64ff; Tower to 
McDonnell: turbulence ahead', Business Week, 23 May 1988, pp. 117-18; 
'American eagle talks turkey with the Taiwanese', Business Week, 2 Dcember 
1991, p. 55). During the 1980s, even Boeing began to suffer significantly from 
the competitive advances of the European Airbus consortium. Similar conse- 
quences appeared in the automobile industry which, faced with severe 
Japanese competition, chose to diversify into defence-related activity. The 
most significant changes occurred in General Motors which, during the mid- 
1980s, acquired EDS and Hughes Aircraft to become one of the country's ten 
largest defence contractors. 
22 Data for domestic deliveries of defence products are available only since 
1968, so earlier data had to be estimated on the basis of contract awards. 
This was done in several stages. First, we estimated a CLM regression for 
the 1968-89 period, with domestic deliveries as a function of a constant, one 
current and three lagged variables for contract awards. Using the estimated 
coefficients from this equation, we then computed the predicted values for 
domestic deliveries for the period between 1963 and 1968. Finally, we spliced 
the predicted series to the actual deliveries series at 1968. 
23 The latest arms export data from the US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency are for 1989, but advance information already indicates that the early 
1990s brought a significant increase in foreign military orders, particularly in 
the aftermath of the 1990/1 Gulf War. According to the US Defense Security 
Assistance Agency (DSAA), export agreements signed under the Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) Program during the 1990-92 period totalled $51.3 billion 
- up 83 per cent from their total of $28.1 billion in the previous three-year 
period (Foreign Milita y Sales, Foreign Construction Sales and Milita y Assistance 
Facts as of September 30, 1992, pp. 2-3). At the same time, DoD data indicate 
that domestic prime contracts awarded over the 1990-2 period fell to $388.7 
billion - down from $408 billion in 1987-9 (100 Companies Receiving the Largest 
DolZar Volume of Prime Contract Awards, the 1987 and 1992 editions). The most 
recent data from the US Congressional Research Service suggest a new record 
for arms exports: while domestic military contracts continued their steep 
descent, foreign deals signed during the year ending October 1993 more than 
doubled from their 1992 level, reaching an all time high of $32 billion ('Boom', 
The Economist, 13 August 1994, p. 24). Of course, not all export sales agree- 
ments and domestic contract awards come to fruition, but to the extent that 
these trends are roughly indicative of future deliveries, we may very well see 
the RDMPe ratio rising in the 1990s up to 30 or even 40 per cent. 
24 The crucial role of arms exports is well depicted by extreme examples. 
Grumman, for instance, was saved from near-bankruptcy in 1974 by a major 
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sale of F-14 Tomcat fighter planes to Iran (Sampson, 1977: 249-56). Similarly, 
during the early 1990s, the proposed sale of 72 F-15 Eagle fighters to Saudi 
Arabia appeared as a near 'makeor-break' for a financially-troubled 
McDonnell Douglas ('Crying "jobs" to sell weapons abroad', Business Week, 
16 March 1992, p. 37). According to the US Defense Security Assistance 
Agency (DSSA), the future survival of important domestic programmes, such 
as the MlAl tank, the Blackhawk helicopter, and the HAWK surfaceto-air- 
missile, is tied to foreign sales (US Congress, Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1991: 3). The adverse consequences of unsuccessful export 
ventures were illustrated in the mid-1980s by Northrop's debacle with the 
F-20 'fighter for export' - a plane which the company had spent $1.4 billion 
to develop but never manage to sell (Ferrari et al., 1987: 27). Unfortunately, 
the lack of adequate statistics on the arms exports of individual corporations 
makes it hard to go much beyond such illustrations. The firm-specific data 
published by the DoD cover only sales agreements (which may be subse 
quently altered or cancelled), but not eventual deliveries. Furthermore, these 
data are restricted to contracts which are channelled through the J?MS 
Programme, while leaving out those that are handled as direct commercial 
sales. 
25 The principal difference between the Foreign Military Sales (M) and Direct 
Commercial Sales (DCS) programmes is that in the former, the US govern- 
ment acts as a paid negotiator between the US defence company and the 
buying government (with a 3 per cent commission), while in the latter, it 
only provides the legal approval for the proposed deal. Initially, DCS were 
limited to contracts worth less than $25 million and, later, to those not 
exceeding $100 million. In 1981, the Reagan Administration eliminated the 
ceiling, allowing buyers to choose their preferred arrangement. DCS are 
commonly more profitable than M and usually less tied to formal US 
foreign policy objectives. Unfortunately, DCS are not documented as well 
as FMS. For more on the two programmes, see Ferrari et al. (1987: 51) and 
US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1991: 11-12; 56-8). 
26 Computed from the US Congress, Economic Report of the President, 1993, Table 
B-76, p. 438. 
27 Earlier precrisis studies are also not without fault. For example, in his work 
on Multinational Oil, Jacoby (1974: 2457) shows that the large oil companies 
suffered a significant decline in their foreign profitability, which he attrib- 
utes to increased competition since the mid-1950s. Jacoby's methodology and 
implications are questionable, however. First, much of the decline of inter- 
national profits in the 1950s was rooted not in a more intense competition, 
but in higher royalties to host countries. Second, since the royalties were 
debited as foreign taxes against the oil companies' domestic operations, 
focusing only on foreign operations serves to conceal the compensating 
increase in domestic after-tax earnings. Indeed, as Blair (1976: 193-203, 
294-320) demonstrates, the decrease in the companies' global rate of return 
was far smaller than the one recorded in their operations abroad. 
Furthermore, global profitability started to rise again in the early 1960s and, 
by the early 1970s, was already far higher than what it was in the early 
1950s. 
28 The 'Petroleum 40-42' include the Petro-Core firms as well as lesser inter- 
national oil companies. Over time, the number and identity of firms in this 
group varied slightly, but since this involves the inclusion or exclusion of 
the relatively smaller companies at the bottom of the list, the impact on the 
composite rate of return is by and large negligible. 
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Although there are no statistics on the global profits of the entire oil industry, 
it is not unreasonable to assume that the 'Petroleum 4042' group accounts 
for the lion's share of such earnings. 
Figures for the corporate sector as a whole represent the net profit compo- 
nent of national income and are hence somewhat different from the 
Petro-Core data which are based on the standard accounting conventions of 
corporate financial reports. However, since we are concerned here not so 
much with adual levels but rather with long-term variations, these differ- 
ences should not affect our conclusions. 
The notion of the 'degree of monopoly' was first proposed by Kalecki (1943) 
to explain price behaviour in finished-goods industries, but this can clearly 
be extended also to oligopolistic situations in the primary-good sector. 
Individual firms could of course augment their reserves via corporate 
mergers and acquisition which leave the industry's overall capacity unal- 
tered. Despite their prevalence, however, such practices have had only a 
limited impact on the long-term expansion of world proven reserves, which 
have risen more than tenfold in the past half century. 
The extent of the companies' control during that time is well illustrated by 
their ability to contain the oil glut of the Great Depression. During the 1930s, 
the Iraqi Petroleum Company (a joint venture between British Petroleum, 
Royal/Dutch Shell, CFP, Exxon, Mobil and Gulbenkian) exercised a 
Yeblenian' policy of 'watchful waiting' throughout much of its Red-Line 
Agreement regions. For example, in Iraq, the company produced in an area 
accounting for only one half of 1 per cent of its entire concession; in Qatar 
it delayed production until 1950, some eighteen years after the first explo- 
ration; and in Syria, the IPC drilled shallow holes, so as to insure that its 
policy of 'sitting on' a concession still complied with its formal exploration 
commitments (Blair, 1976: 80-6). 
Indeed, many policy initiatives were cancelled solely due to opposition from 
the large companies. For example, during the Second World War, the large 
firms objected to the attempt by the Petroleum Reserve Corporation to take con- 
trol over their joint Saudi holdings, much as they opposed the Anglo-American 
Oil Agreement and the Saudi-Arabian Pipehne. The big companies also refused 
to allow independent companies more than a symbolic share in the 1953 Iranian 
Conso~tium, objected to the 1970 Shultz Report which suggested substituting 
tariffs for the dated system of import quotas, and ignored the Administration's 
request that they accommodate Libyan demands for a higher price. As a result, 
none of these policies and suggestions came to fruition (see Blair, 1976: 220-30; 
Krasner, 1978: 190-205; Turner, 1983: 4&7,152-4). 
BP Statistical Reuiew of World Energy, (1990: 5). 
This negative association prevails even if we exclude Communist countries: 
based on data from the BP Statistical Reuiew of World Energy, production in 
the non-Communist world exceeded consumption by 2.1 per cent in 1973, 
and by 4.0 per cent in 1974. 
See 'Why big oil loves cheaper oil', Business Week, 11 February 1991, pp. 26-7. 
The corresponding shares for 1990 were 27 per cent out of total production 
and 66per cent of proven reserves. Data computed from Jacoby (1974, Table 
5.1, pp. 68-9; Table 5.2, pp. 74-5) and from BP Statistical Reuiew of World 
Energy (1991: 2, 4). 
See for instance 'How the price of oil hit $40 a barrel', Fortune, 5 November 
1990, p. 12. 
OPEC governments are of course interested not so much in the overall value 
of exports, as in the income they derive from those exports (after cost and 
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the share of the oil companies). Unfortunately, there are no comprehensive 
statistics on OPEC's 'intake', though this should be tightly correlated with 
the total value of its oil exports. Such close correlation is evident from partial 
data on the Middle East, where the Pearson's correlation coefficient (r) 
between government oil receipts and the overall value of oil exports for 
the 1961-89 period is 0.998 (computations based on data from the 
American Petroleum Institute as reported in Bina, 1985, Table 22, p. 98, and 
various issues of the BP Statistical Review of World Energy and the UN 
Statistical Yearbook). 
41 We should note that in focusing on the association between oil revenues and 
arms exports we are not endorsing standard 'statist' or 'recycling' explana- 
tions. Our emphasis on accumulation would have been better served by 
examining the impact of Middle East oil revenues on the profits from foreign 
military sales but, unfortunately (though perhaps not surprisingly), data on 
such profits are conspicuously lacking. 
42 Although this could not be ascertained without proper data, it is not unrea- 
sonable to expect a similarly tight correlation between oil income and 
armament profits. 
43 For example, based on US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency data, 
the implicit price deflator for arms imports into the Middle East rose at an 
average annual rate of 6.8 per cent during the 1970s and 4.4 per cent during 
the 1980s (computed from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 
1970-79 edition, Table 11, p. 87; 1990 edition, Table 11, p. 91). 
44 As we noted in Section 2, there is no easy way to identify the domestic and 
foreign components of the Arma-Core's military-related profits. However, 
since foreign military sales constitute a net addition to domestic military 
procurement, and given that the export markup is commonly higher than 
the one earned on domestic operations, military contractors have little reason 
to forgo export opportunities abroad. 
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APPENDIX A 
Aggregate financial statistics for the sixteen Anna-Core Companiesa# 
($ million) 
Year Sales DoD prime contract &ners' Net 
awards equity profit 
Source: Data on company sales, owners' equity and net profits are from Standard & Poor's 
Compustat Services (1986) and 'The Fortune 500' (various years). Department of Defense 
(DoD) prime contract awards are from US Department of Defense, Washington 
Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 100 Companies 
Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards (various years). 
Notes 
a The sixteen Arma-Core firms include, in alphabetical order, Boeing, General Dynamics, 
General Electric, Grumman, Honeywell, Litton Industries, Lockhed, McDonnell 
Douglas, Martin Marietta, Northrop, Raytheon, Rockwell International, Texas 
Instrument, Textron, United Technologies (United Aircraft until 1974) and 
Westinghouse. 
Sales, owners' equity and net profit are for calendar years while DoD prime contract 
awards are for fiscal years. 
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APPENDIX B 
Aggregate financial statistics for the six Petro-Core companiesa ($ million) 
Year Sales Owners' equity Net profit 
THE WEAPONDOLLAR-PETRODOLLAR COALITION 
Appendix B continued 
Year Sales Owners' equity Net profit 
Source: For 1930-56, data are from (YConnor (1962: 19-20). For 1957-91, data are from 
Standard & Poor's Compustat Services (1986); The Foreign 500' (various years); 
The Fortune 500' (various years); The Fortune International 500' (various years); The 
International 20 '  (various years); 'Guide to the Global 500' (various years). 
Note: (a) The six Petro-Core companies include, in alphabetical order, British Petroleum 
(previously Anglo-Persian and Anglo-Iranian) Chevron (previously Socal), Exxon 
(previously Standard Oil of New Jersey), Mobil (previously Socony and Socony-Mobil), 
Royal Dutch/Shell and Texaco. 
